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THE INTERSECTION OF INCOME TAX THEORY
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I. INTRODUCTION
Ideally, income tax laws should shadow the economic effects
of commercial transactions. This shadowing effect promotes
predictability, certainty, and stability. The ideal can be difficult
to achieve when an uncooperative commercial transaction
straddles two or more independent, but related, economic
models that have dramatically dissimilar tax implications.
Under such equivocal circumstances, a court must choose
sides. Is one of the existing economic models appropriate or
should the court create a new model? Courts normally resolve
this choice through an analogical legal reasoning process
which attempts to associate the current transaction with the ex-
isting economic model it most closely resembles.
The results of this myopic judicial search for analogies are
not always satisfying. New economic transactions tend to rep-
licate the formal characteristics of existing arrangements that
have known tax outcomes.' As a result, the tax law no longer
shadows economics; it dictates the economic structure. This
places a premium on sophisticated and expensive tax advice. If
2. While the substance of a transaction will normally control its form, in these
cases form is elevated over substance simply because little substance separates the
two arrangements.
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the tax treatment can be predicted with confidence, then the
result is moderately acceptable. However, when the judicial
reasoning process consists of simply listing factual compari-
sons, uncertainty will develop. Left unchallenged, this uncer-
tainty eventually develops into stability, as practitioners are
lulled into a false sense of confidence. But when tragedy
strikes in the form of a surprising challenge to what was once
thought secure, it brings with it renewed doubt. Such is the
case with regard to the tax treatment accorded to the receipt of
a partnership profits interest' under the Tax Court decision in
Campbell v. Commissioner4 and its subsequent reversal by the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.'
This Article concludes that the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals reached the correct result in Campbell by not taxing the
receipt of the profits interest, but its fair market value rationale
was critically flawed. The decision does little to resolve future
controversy over the taxation of the receipt of a profits interest
in exchange for services rendered. The Eighth Circuit's reso-
lution of the case on the basis of the value of the interest re-
ceived may have been the most narrow and convenient
approach, since the case will be limited to its facts. Unfortu-
nately, adequate opportunity existed to resolve the broader
legal issue that has persisted since 1970-is the receipt of a
profits interest generally taxable upon receipt? The govern-
ment conceded in its appellate brief to the Eighth Circuit in
Campbell that such a receipt is generally not taxable.6 It is
therefore astonishing that the Eighth Circuit did not seize the
opportunity to clarify this historically murky area of tax law.
Despite the Eighth Circuit's reticence to resolve this issue,
3. For purposes of this article, a "profits interest" is defined as a partnership
interest under which the service partner is entitled to only a share of partnership
profits and partnership asset appreciation occurring after the receipt of the interest.
Subsequent partnership profits therefore include undistributed profits that become
part of post-receipt capital. This definition excludes partnership interests under
which the service partner shares in any partnership capital existing at the time the
profits interest is received. Pre-receipt capital includes contributed capital, pre-re-
ceipt unrealized appreciation or depreciation attributable to that capital, and pre-
receipt undistributed profits. See Daniel S. Kleinberger & Barbara A. Wrigley, Who
Owns the Christmas Tree? The Disposition of Property Used by a Partnership, 39 KAN. L. REV.
245, 266-67 (1991).
4. Campbell v. Commissioner, 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 236 (1990), rev'd, 943 F.2d 815
(8th Cir. 1991).
5. Campbell v. Commissioner, 943 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1991).
6. See infra Part V.B.
19921
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the lingering question is why the government does not simply
amend its regulations to conform to its own appellate conces-
sion in Campbell. At the very least, the government should is-
sue a revenue ruling clarifying its position.7 Considering the
longstanding failure of the government to issue any such regu-
latory clarification, the Eighth Circuit should have resolved the
legal standard.
II. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS: UNDERSTANDING THE ALTERNATIVES
Comparing the established method of taxing the receipt of a
capital interest to possible methods of taxing directly a receipt
of a profits interest exposes the consequences of different
treatment for profits interests.
A. Receipt of a Capital Interest
A partner who renders services to a partnership in exchange
for an interest in partnership capital is taxed when the capital
interest is received.8 The transaction is treated as if a current
interest in the ownership of the partnership assets were paid to
the receiving partner and re-contributed to the partnership. 9
Both the receiving partner (the service partner) and the part-
ners who relinquished an interest in the partnership capital
(the non-service partners) must account for the transfer.
7. At the American Bar Association's February 14, 1992, meeting in San
Antonio, Texas, Mary Harmon, Assistant to the Chief Counsel of the IRS, spoke at
the Tax Section's Partnership Committee meeting. She explained that the Service's
concession only applied to the particular facts of Campbell I. She added that the Ser-
vice is actively considering the issue of whether a partner recognizes income on re-
ceipt of a profits interest and hinted that the question of whether the partner is acting
in an employee or a partner capacity would be important. In the meantime, field
agents are to check with the IRS National Office if they have a Campbell I type issue.
Lee A. Sheppard, News Roundups from the ABA Tax Section's Midyear Meeting: Harmon
Discusses Partnership Interest Issues of Campbell Case, 54 TAx NoTEs 936-37 (1992).
8. See United States v. Frazell, 335 F.2d 487, 489 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 961 (1965); Farris v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 104 (1954), revd, 222 F.2d 320
(10th Cir. 1955); Lehman v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 659 (1953).
9. I.R.C. § 83(a) (1988). Ownership of the capital interest is subject to the
terms of the partnership agreement. Depending upon the agreement's terms, the
service partner's interest in the partnership is withdrawn either as an operating or
liquidating distribution. This interest is considered the equivalent of the service
partner's share of the partnership's liquidation value.
[Vol. 18
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1. Non-Service Partners
a. Gain or Loss on Transfer
If the aggregate fair market value of the partnership assets at
the time of transfer is greater or less than their aggregate ad-
justed bases, the non-service partners must recognize a per-
centage of the difference equal to the percentage of the capital
transferred.' The character of any gain or loss is determined
by the nature of, and holding period for, each asset of the
partnership. It
b. Deductions
A transfer of a capital interest is regarded as a guaranteed
payment to be deducted or capitalized by the non-service part-
ners according to the nature of the services rendered to the
partnership.'" Payments for services rendered prior to the for-
mation of the partnership are normally capitalized as section
709 organization or syndication expenses.' 3  Payments for
services rendered after partnership formation are more likely
to be deductible as an ordinary business expense.' 4
10. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-6(b) (1978).
11. See United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 74 (1962); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.83-6
(1978). For example, assume that the AB Partnership had only two assets and no
liabilities when it transferred a 10% capital interest from A to B. Its assets were (1)
accounts receivable with a $1,000 fair market value and $0 basis, and (2) land (a
capital asset of the partnership with a two year holding period) with a $1,000 fair
market value and $200 basis. The partnership must recognize $100 in ordinary in-
come from the accounts receivable transfer and $80 in long term capital gain from
the land transfer:
AccouNTs RECEIVABLE TRANSFER
$100 FMV (10% x $1000)
- $ 0 Basis (10% x $ 0)
$100 Ordinary Income
LAND TRANSFER
$100 FMV (10% X $1000)
$ 20 Basis (10% x $ 200)
$ 80 Capital Gain
Assuming that A contributed the accounts receivable and land to the partnership and
rendered services prior to the formation of the partnership, section 704(c) would
require A to recognize the $80 gain. I.R.C. § 704(c) (1988).
12. Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(2) (1960).
13. I.R.C. § 709 (1988).
14. Guaranteed payments for ordinary and necessary expenses, such as payments
for services rendered, are deductible as business expenses under section 162. See
19921
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2. Service Partner
a. Income
A service partner who receives an interest in partnership
capital in exchange for services rendered to the partnership, in
the past or to be rendered in the future, realizes ordinary in-
come in an amount equal to the fair market value of the part-
nership interest.' 5 The service partner must include the full
value of the capital interest in income in the year the partner-
ship "accounts" for the payment.' 6 As a result, the service
partner must include the fair market value of the capital inter-
est as income even if the non-service partners capitalize the
guaranteed payment.' 7 The service partner realizes the in-
come even if no money was received.'
8
I.R.C. § 83(h) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 1.83-6(a) (1978). Guaranteed payments for capi-
tal outlays must be capitalized. Treas. Reg. § 1.707-1(c) (as amended in 1983).
To assure that the service partner does not share in the tax deduction attributa-
ble to the transfer of the capital interest, the partnership agreement should make a
section 704(b) special allocation of the deduction to the non-service pArtners. I.R.C.
§ 704(b) (1988). Using the example of the AB Partnership, infra, Part II.A.3, if A had
contributed cash to the partnership, which had in turn acquired the assets, the part-
nership should make a special allocation of any gain or loss to A under section
704(b). The special allocation would prevent B from recognizing income twice: when
he or she receives the capital interest and later when the partnership recognizes gain.
Id.
15. The income realized from the assets in exchange for services rendered is al-
ways ordinary income. I.R.C. § 83(a) (1988).
16. Treas. Reg. § 1.707-1(c) (as amended in 1983). If the partnership interest is
subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture as defined in sections 83(a) and (c), the
partnership would not account for the transfer until the service partner's interest no
longer was subject to such risk or became transferable. I.R.C. § 83(a) (1988); Treas.
Reg. § 1.83-7(a). If the service partner's full enjoyment of the capital interest is con-
ditioned upon the future performance of substantial services, the interest is usually
considered to be subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. I.R.C. § 83(c)(1) (1988).
Up until the time when the restrictions on the service partner's interest lapse, the
partnership remains the owner of the interest. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-1(a)(1) (as
amended in 1978). In order for the partnership to avoid taxation as the owner dur-
ing this time, the service partner may elect, under section 83(b), to include the inter-
est's value in income at the time of receipt. There is, however, one drawback to this
election. If, after including the capital interest in current income, the partner must
forfeit the interest, the resulting loss is not deductible. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-2(a)
(1978).
17. Gaines v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 363, 373 (1982).
18. Using the example of the AB Partnership, infra Part II.A.3., B would have
$400 ordinary income at the time the partnership accounts for the transfer of the
capital interest. Assuming the interest transferred to B is not subject to a risk of
forfeiture under section 83, the partnership must account for any gain or loss at the
time of the transfer, regardless of whether the partnership must capitalize the ex-
pense of the transfer. See I.R.C. § 83(h) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 1.83-6 (1978).
[Vol. 18
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b. Basis
The service partner is treated as if the capital interest were
received and recontributed to the partnership. 19 The basis of
the capital interest is equal to its fair market value at the time
of transfer.2 ' This basis prevents the service partner from rec-
ognizing the same income twice-first at the time of receipt
and second when the interest is sold by the service partner or
the partnership.2
3. Capital Account and Balance Sheet Analysis
In order to visualize this transaction in a slightly different
manner, the following capital account analysis reflects a hypo-
thetical partnership balance sheet. In the pre-transfer balance
sheet assume that A and B form the AB Partnership by contrib-
uting $500 each, which is used to buy $1,000 in IBM stock. By
the time A and B wish to admit C by transferring a 10% capital
interest for architectural services performed in designing the
plans for the new partnership business headquarters, the IBM
stock has appreciated to $1,200. The original partnership bal-
ance sheet would appear as follows:
AB PARTNERSHIP; ORIGINAL BALANCE SHEET
ASSET: ADJUSTED BASIS: BOOK VALUE:
Cash $1,000 $1,000
Total $1,000 $1,000
CAPITAL: ADJUSTED BASIS: BOOK VALUE:
A $ 500 $ 500
B 500 500
Total $1,000 $1,000
Immediately before the contemplated transfer to C, the
partnership balance sheet would appear as follows:
19. See McDougal v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 720, 725-26 (1974).
20. I.R.C. § 1012 (1988); Treas. Reg. § 1.83-4 (1978).
21. Partnership assets attributable to the interest can be sold by the partnership
or by the service partner following an asset distribution. A partner with a capital
interest is entitled to a share of the partnership's net assets upon the liquidation of
the partnership or withdrawal of the owner-partner. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.704-
1 (e) (1) (v) (as amended in 1988). However, many other factors affect the value of the
interest. For example, the partnership interest may be subject to a buy-sell agree-
ment at a formula price that depresses its value, the interest may be subject to a
minority share discount, or the partnership may own intangible assets that are diffi-
cult to value. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-5(a) (1978); Edgar v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.
717, 762 (1971).
1992]
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AB PARTNERSHIP; PRE-TRANSFER BALANCE SHEET
ASSET: ADJUSTED BASIS: FAIR MARKET VALUE:
IBM Stock $1,000 $1,200
Total $1,000 $1,200
CAPITAL: ADJUSTED BASIS: BOOK VALUE:
A $ 500 $ 600
B 500 600
Total $1,000 $1,200
Immediately after the contemplated transfer to C, the
partnership balance sheet would appear as follows, assuming
that the architectural fees were capitalized as a future
construction cost of the building:
AB PARTNERSHIP; POST-TRANSFER BALANCE SHEET
ASSET: ADJUSTED BASIS: FAIR MARKET VALUE:
IBM Stock-90% $ 900 $1,080
IBM Stock-10% 120 120
Architectural Fees 120 0
Total $1,140 $1,200
CAPITAL: ADJUSTED BASIS: BOOK VALUE:
A $ 510 (500 + 10 gain) $ 540
B 510 (500 + 10 gain) 540
C 120 120
Total $1,140 $1,200
This third and final balance sheet reflects that (1) A and B have
recognized $20 ($120 fair market value less $100 adjusted
basis) on the 10% capital interest transferred to C, (2) A and B
have not yet taken a deduction for the $120 value transfer to C
since the expense of the transfer was capitalized, but A and B
will be entitled to $120 in additional depreciation deductions
through a $120 basis increase to the building when
constructed, (3) A and B will recognize the $180 ($1,080 fair
market value less $900 adjusted basis) remainder of their
original $200 ($1,200 fair market value less $1,000 adjusted
basis) pre-transfer gain when the IBM stock is sold, and (4) C
has recognized $120 income. In effect, C has transferred the
capital interest back to the partnership and received a basis in
the partnership interest equal to its current fair market value.
Having recognized the receipt as income at the time of receipt,
C will not recognize income again at the liquidation of the
partnership through a receipt of an amount of money equal to
the earlier income recognition.
[Vol. 18
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4. Economic Liquidation Analysis
In order to test the economic reality of the above arrange-
ment, the AB Partnership may be hypothetically liquidated im-
mediately after the transfer to C by selling all the assets for
cash and distributing the proceeds to the partners in accord-
ance with their capital account ratios. If the IBM stock were
sold after the transfer when it had not changed value, A and B
would recognize $180 gain and receive a $120 deduction for
the abandonment of the building plans. In total, A and B
would have recognized the $200 pre-transfer gain and received
a $120 deduction for the value of the capital interest trans-
ferred to C. C would wind up with $120 in cash. A and B
would wind up with $1,080 in cash, their original contribution
of $1,000 plus $20 gain on the transfer plus $180 gain on the
liquidation sale less $120 transferred to C for services ren-
dered. C would recognize no gain or loss on the liquidation of
the partnership interest for $120 since the income was cor-
rectly recognized as ordinary income on receipt. 2
B. Receipt of a Profits Interest
Contrasted with the taxation of the receipt of a capital inter-
est, the taxation of the receipt of a profits interest is considera-
bly more problematic. The difficulty stems from the
fundamental characteristics of the respective interests. A capi-
tal interest is a static target. Once the service partner includes
the value of the capital interest in income, any changes in the
value of the interest merely constitute unrealized gain or loss.
If, prior to a liquidating distribution of the partnership capital,
any portion of the interest is sold or otherwise disposed of in a
taxable transaction, gain or loss would be recognized at that
time as "profit or loss. ' ' 23 In contrast, the value of a profits
interest will include the value of any anticipated realized gains
or losses attributable to the capital, profits, and services.
As a moving target, the taxation of the receipt of a profits
interest primarily presents a question of timing. Timing the
taxation of the receipt of a profits interest is particularly prob-
22. In addition to denying C an unwarranted tax deferral as compared to other
similarly situated taxpayers, this procedure prevents C from converting ordinary in-
come from services rendered into capital gain on the sale of a partnership interest
under section 741.
23. I.R.C. § 1001 (1988).
1992]
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lematic because of the aggregate approach 24 of partnership tax
law, which treats a partnership as a conduit for the conduct of
business by its partners. Under the aggregate theory, a part-
nership would not recognize income from future profits until
they were actually received. Since the service partner's income
is completely tied to the partnership's future profits, he or she
likewise should not recognize income from a profits until it is
actually received.
In resolving the timing issue, one question is whether to al-
low the service partner to use the open transaction method.
Should the transaction be held open where the service partner
recognizes income only when the partnership realizes, recog-
nizes, and allocates a distributive share to the service partner?
Alternatively, should the transaction be deemed closed when
the service partner recognizes income on the receipt of the
profits interest? The latter treatment is more favorable to the
service partner since it will (1) defer the payment of taxes on
income realized in connection with the receipt of the profits
interests to future years when the partnership actually realizes
the associated income, and (2) conceivably permit the service
partner to convert the ordinary income for services rendered
into capital gain if the future associated partnership distribu-
tive share or liquidation payment is capital gain income.
Since partners who receive a capital interest for services ren-
dered cannot obtain the benefits of the open transaction
method, 25 the natural tendency is to deny its use to partners
24. The "aggregate" approach insists that all income and loss of the partnership
flow through to the individual partners. Under this concept, each partner would re-
port such items for tax purposes according to each partner's share under the partner-
ship agreement. See CARTER G. BIsHOP & JENNIFER J.S. BROOKS, FEDERAL
PARTNERSHIP TAXATION 6 (1990). The aggregate approach characterizes a partner's
sale or exchange of an interest in the partnership as more like the sale of a going
concern. The selling partner will be deemed to have sold his or her share of each
partnership asset. Id. at 274.
In contrast, the "entity" concept of partnership taxation treats the partnership as
a separate entity in order to determine the amount, character, and timing of income
and loss of the partnership. This concept ignores the individual tax circumstances of
the partners. Therefore, it sometimes permits the conversion of ordinary income
into capital gain, or the assignment of income among partners. Id. at 6. When there
has been a sale or exchange of a partnership interest, the entity theory would view
the partner as transferring the partnership interest itself, independent of the part-
ner's interest in the partnership assets. Id. at 273-74.
25. The legislative history of the Installment Sales Revision Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-471, 94 Stat. 2247 (1980), indicates Congress' intention to reduce the justifi-
cations for treating transactions as "open" and permitting the use of the cost recov-
[Vol. 18
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who receive a profits interest unless there is an extraordinary
reason to do so. One reason to give the recipient of a profits
interest such "preferential" treatment is that the partnership
interest received represents, at most, an unsecured and un-
funded promise to pay a speculative sum of money in the fu-
ture. The receipt of such a "mere promise to pay" does not
constitute a taxable event under the common law economic
benefit doctrine 26 and does not constitute property under sec-
tion 83.27 Therefore, no service provider would, or should, be
taxed on the receipt of such an interest under section 83 or the
section 61 economic benefit analysis.
2 8
1. Non-Service Partners
a. Gain or Loss on Transfer
Because the partnership has not yet realized future profits,
the non-service partners' interest in the future profits has an
adjusted basis of zero. Therefore, the non-service partners
will recognize as income the full fair market value of the profits
interest transferred to the service partner. Generally, any gain
ery method sanctioned by Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931). S. REP. No. 1000,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, 24 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4696, 4717. The
Senate Report further indicates that Congress intended the cost-recovery method to
be limited to "those rare and extraordinary circumstances involving sales for a con-
tingent price where the fair market value of the purchaser's obligation cannot reason-
ably be ascertained." Id. at 4719.
26. See Minor v. United States, 772 F.2d 1472, 1475 (9th Cir. 1985). See generally
Carter G. Bishop & Marian McMahon Durkin, Nonqualifed Deferred Compensation Plans:
A Review and Critique, 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 43, 109-112 (1990).
27. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (1978).
28. This argument in support of open transaction treatment is also consistent
with the theme of the 1984 amendments to section 707(a), which provide that if a
partner is acting in the capacity of a partner, the partner's distributive share is taxable
as realized by the partnership. H. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3 at 1218
(1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 697, 884-85. The report provides:
If a partner performs services for, or transfers property to, a partner-
ship, and receives a related allocation (direct or indirect) of partnership in-
come or gain, the transaction will be treated as a transaction between the
partnership and a person who is not a partner, if a direct payment for the
property or services would have been a capital expenditure by the partner-
ship .... [T]he committee does not intend to repeal the general rule under
which gain or loss is not recognized on a contribution of property in return
for a partnership interest (sec. 721) or to apply this new provision in cases in
which a partner receives an allocation (or an increased allocation) for an
extended period to reflect his contribution of property or services, payment
for which must be capitalized, to the partnership provided the allocation is
not fixed or determinable.
19921
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from the transaction will be characterized as ordinary income
as an anticipatory assignment of future partnership income. 9
b. Deductions
The non-service partners should be entitled to a business
deduction to offset their economic loss in relinquishing the
profits share.3 1 Since the non-service partners have a zero ba-
sis in the future profits interest, the amount of the deduction
will exactly offset the amount of income recognized. 3 ' Thus,
the transfer of a profits interest will be a non-taxable event for
the non-service partners unless the income is treated as a capi-
tal gain and the offsetting deduction is considered an ordinary
deduction, or the offsetting deduction is deferred to a different
period than the income recognition because of a required
capitalization.3"
2. Service Partner
The service partner must account for the receipt of the prof-
its interest in the current year ("closed transaction") or ac-
count for the receipt of the profits interest by including in
income a distributable share of future partnership profits as
the partnership realizes the profits ("open transaction"). The
resolution of the timing question affects the amount of income
recognized by the service partner and his or her future basis in
the partnership profits interest.
33
29. Arguably, the gain could be characterized as a capital gain if the transfer is
considered a sale or exchange of a partnership interest under section 741. See I.R.C.
§ 741 (1988). It is unlikely, however, that the future profits would be considered
"unrealized receivables" under section 751. Future profits are not receivables at the
time of the transfer. See I.R.C. § 751 (1988). To date, the case law has focused on
whether the service partner is taxed on the mere receipt of a profits interest. The
courts have not yet considered the collateral effect on the non-service partners. For
an anticipatory assignment of income analysis, see STEPHEN A. LIND, FUNDAMENTALS
OF PARTNERSHIP TAXATION 88-91 (3d ed. 1992) (quoting TAX SECTION COMM. ON
PARTNERSHIPS, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, PROPOSAL TO AMEND THE REGULATIONS UNDER
SECTIONS 83 AND 721 (April 1987)).
30. I.R.C. § 162 (1988).
31. Like the transfer of a capital interest, a transfer of a profits interest should be
regarded as a guaranteed payment, which will either be deducted or capitalized ac-
cording to the nature of the services rendered to the partnership. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.721-1(b)(2) (1960).
32. Id.
33. A decision to tax the receipt of a profits interest as the profits are realized by
the partnership means that the service partner will defer taxation of the present value
of the partnership profits interest. In future years, the service partner will recognize
[Vol. 18
12
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 14
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol18/iss3/14
PARTNERSHIP TAXATION
a. Current Income Recognition Treatment
The income received by the service partner is a distributive
share of the partnership's future income. Thus, the decision to
tax the receipt of the interest is equivalent to a decision to tax
the present value of the future estimated partnership profits.
This will raise metaphysical questions about the proper valua-
tion of the partnership interest.34
The current recognition of income will create a correspond-
ing basis.35 Like the receipt of a capital interest, the service
partner will be treated as if the service partner received the
interest and contributed it back to the partnership. 36 If the fair
market value of the profits interest is recognized as current in-
come, both the service partner and the partnership will acquire
a basis in the future profits equal to the amount of income rec-
ognized under sections 722 and 723.
Taxation of the service partner and the partnership when the
partnership realizes the profits attributable to the profits inter-
est depends upon whether the partnership is entitled to amor-
tize its section 723 basis. The profits interest was given a
present value that contemplated some liquidation point.
Therefore, the amortization period should be the same. The
Service should not, on the one hand, be entitled to assume a
liquidation timing model for purposes of income inclusion
and, at the same time, deny the use of the same time period for
purposes of straight-line amortization.37
a pro-rata share of this deferral amount. Additional amounts will be recognized as
essentially an interest income substitute. Unfortunately, the character of the income
receipt of a profits interest will depend on the character of the partnership income. If
a portion of the future partnership income consists of capital gain income, it will be
possible for the service partner to transmute ordinary income from services and in-
terest income into capital gain, which is taxed at a lower rate. Although this aspect is
troubling, it is not without precedent, particularly when the service provider's efforts
have "produced" a state law interest in property. See Heim v. Fitzpatrick, 262 F.2d
887 (2d Cir. 1959). The analogy could be completed only in those realistic situations
when it could be fairly said that the service partner's efforts "created" the profits
interest.
34. As reflected by Judge Scott in Campbell I, difficult valuation questions are not
an effective roadblock to current taxation. Campbell v. Commissioner, 59 T.C.M.
(CCH) 236, 254 (1990), rev'd, 943 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1991). At this point, the argu-
ments translate into factual questions of valuation which become, in part, a battle of
experts. The trial court is relegated to weighing the expert testimony and making a
calculated decision. See id.
35. I.R.C. §§ 742, 1012 (1988).
36. McDougal v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 720, 725-26 (1974).
37. An ABA proposal issued in 1987 suggests an artificial 60-month amortiza-
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If the partnership is not entitled to amortize its inside basis
in the profits interests, the service partner's outside basis
would exceed the partnership's basis in the cash now collected.
Since such an event as profits realization is not specified in
either section 734 or section 743, the triggering mechanisms
for a section 754 election basis adjustment to partnership as-
sets would not occur. Accordingly, an uncorrectable inside-
outside basis discrepancy would exist.38 This is exactly what
section 754 corrects and any taxation theory creating such a
mismatch should be disfavored. 9
b. Deferred Income Recognition Treatment
Under a deferred income scenario, the service partner would
recognize no current income upon receipt of the profits inter-
est. Instead, he or she would recognize an allocable share of
the partnership income in the same year that the partnership
recognizes the income. Since the service partner recognizes
no income on receipt, the non-service partners receive a basis
in the profits as they are reported.
Although fraught with concerns over an unwarranted defer-
ral and potential conversion of income, this approach is clearly
preferable. It avoids the double taxation issues arising from
inadequate basis recovery methods. It also sidesteps the lack
tion period to promote certainty. This time period is also consistent with the amorti-
zation period of organization expenses under section 709. See LIND, supra note 29, at
93.
38. See Terence F. Cuff, Current Issues in Partnership Taxation, N.Y.U. PROC. OF THE
FoRTY-NINrH INST. ON FED. TAX'N § 13.04[2] (1991).
39. BIsHoP & BROOKS, supra note 24, at 318. Even if the partnership is not enti-
tled to amortize its basis in the profits interest, the service partner will not be subject
to double taxation. The partnership's realization of the income will increase the ser-
vice partner's outside basis in an amount greater than outside basis. Accordingly,
when the partnership is liquidated, the service partner's outside basis would exceed
its fair market value, creating an offsetting deductible loss under section 731 (a). The
loss deduction is clearly inadequate for fair compensation for the double inclusion in
income. First, the character of the loss deduction will be a capital loss under section
741. Such a loss may offset only other current or future capital gains that the service
partner may or may not have. Since the capital loss may not be carried back to earlier
years under section 1211, the loss may never actually be used, except to the extent of
a minimal $3000 annual allowance as an offset to ordinary income. Even if the capital
loss were entirely deductible in the year of relinquishment, the deduction would rep-
resent grossly inadequate compensation for the double income inclusion, since (1)
the character of the earlier inclusion would likely be nearly entirely ordinary income
and (2) the timing of the deduction, and therefore, its present value, would be grossly
disproportionate to the present value of the earlier inclusions. Id.
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of an established response under Subchapter K of the Internal
Revenue Code for the income and deduction offset to the non-
service partners.
3. Capital Account and Balance Sheet Analysis
Using the same example of the AB Partnership above, as-
sume that A and B, who each hold a 50% capital interest, wish
to admit C by transferring a 10% profits interest for architec-
tural services performed. Assume that A, B, and C realistically
agreed that the partnership profits interest had current present
value of $100. The original partnership balance sheet would
appear as follows:
AB PARTNERSHIP; ORIGINAL BALANCE SHEET
ASSET: ADJUSTED BASIS: BOOK VALUE:
Cash $1,000 $1,000
Total $1,000 $1,000
CAPITAL: ADJUSTED BASIS: BOOK VALUE:
A $ 500 $ 500
B 500 500
Total $1,000 $1,000
Immediately before the contemplated transfer to C, the
partnership balance sheet would appear as follows:
AB PARTNERSHIP; PRE-TRANSFER BALANCE SHEET
ASSET: ADJUSTED BASIS: FAIR MARKET VALUE:
IBM Stock $1,000 $1,200
Total $1,000 $1,200
CAPITAL: ADJUSTED BASIS: BOOK VALUE:
A $ 500 $ 600
B 500 600
Total $1,000 $1,200
Immediately after the contemplated transfer to C, the
partnership balance sheet would appear as follows, assuming
that the profits interest was taxable upon receipt and the
architectural fees were capitalized as a future construction cost
of the building:
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AB PARTNERSHIP; POST-TRANSFER BALANCE SHEET
ASSET: ADJUSTED BASIS: FAIR MARKET VALUE:
IBM Stock $1,000 $1,200
Architectural Fees 100 0
Profits Interest 100 0
Total $1,200 $1,200
CAPITAL: ADJUSTED BASIS: BOOK VALUE:
A $ 550 (500 + 50 gain) $ 550
B 550 (500 + 50 gain) 550
C 100 100
Total $1,200 $1,200
The last balance sheet reflects that (1) A and B have recognized
$100 ($100 agreed fair market value less $0 adjusted basis) on
the 10% profits interest transferred to C, (2) A and B have not
yet taken a deduction for the $100 transfer to C since the
expense of the transfer was capitalized but A and B will be
entitled to $100 in additional depreciation deductions through
a $100 basis increase to the building when constructed, (3) A
and B will continue to recognize 90% of future profits, and (4)
C has recognized $100 income on the receipt of the profits
interest and thereby receives a $100 basis in the partnership
interest, and (5) the partnership obtains a section 723
hypothetical contribution basis. If the partnership is not
entitled to amortize this inside basis, such basis effectively
transfers to the money profits, as collected, an artificial inside-
outside basis distortion beyond the scope of section 754.
Thus, if a profits interest is taxed upon receipt, the
partnership, and hence the partners, must be entitled to
amortize the partnership's inside basis.
Assuming that C's 10% profits interest maintains its original
$100 value, and the partnership is not entitled to amortize its
basis, C will recognize another $100 in partnership profits but
the partnership will have only $100 to distribute to C on
liquidation. Thus, C will recognize ordinary income in the year
of receipt, ordinary income at the time the partnership realizes
its profits, and a capital loss at the time the partnership
liquidates. Ignoring the deferral and characterization issues, C
will not incur ultimate double taxation.
Immediately after the contemplated transfer to C, the
partnership balance sheet would appear as follows assuming
that the profits interest was not taxable upon receipt but the
[Vol. 18
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architectural fees were capitalized as a future construction cost
of the building:
AB PARTNERSHIP; POST-TRANSFER BALANCE SHEET
ASSET: ADJUSTED BASIS: FAIR MARKET VALUE:
IBM Stock $1,000 $1,200
Architectural Fees 100 0
Total $1,100 $1,200
CAPITAL: ADJUSTED BASIS: BOOK VALUE:
A $ 550 (500 + 50 gain) $ 550
B 550 (500 + 50 gain) 550
C 0 100
Total $1,100 $1,200
The last balance sheet reflects that (1) A and B have recognized
$100 ($100 agreed fair market value less $0 adjusted basis) on
the 10% profits interest transferred to C, (2) A and B have not
yet taken a deduction for the $100 value transfer to C, since the
expense of the transfer was capitalized, but A and B will be
entitled to $100 in additional depreciation deductions through
a $100 basis increase to the building when constructed, (3) A
and B will continue to recognize 90% of future profits, and (4)
C has not recognized $100 income on the receipt of the profits
interest and thereby does not receive a $100 basis in the
partnership interest.
4. Economic Liquidation Analysis
Assuming that C's 10% profits interest maintains its original
$100 value, C will recognize $100 in partnership profits as the
partnership realizes the profits, and the partnership will have
only $100 to distribute to C on liquidation. Therefore, C will
recognize no gain or loss when the $100 is distributed on liqui-
dation. Under this scenario, C will recognize income only once
as the partnership realizes the income.
III. THE DIAMOND LEGACY
Prior to 1971, tax practitioners assumed that a partner's re-
ceipt of a profits interest (as opposed to a capital interest) in
exchange for services rendered to the partnership would not
be taxable on receipt. 40 Income attributable to the profits in-
terest was reported as an allocable share of partnership profits
40. See generally 1 WILLIAM S. MCKEE ET AL., FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS
AND PARTNERS 5.06[2], at 5-34 to 5-35 (1977).
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as those profits were recognized by the partnership. Since the
service partner was not taxed on the receipt, the profits inter-
est had a zero tax basis in order to preserve future taxation of
the absolute profits. 4'
This assumption was shaken in 1971 by the United States
Tax Court's decision in Diamond v. Commissioner (Diamond I),42
and was affirmed by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals (Dia-
mond 11).43 Diamond I held that section 721 of the Internal Rev-
enue Code did not shield a service partner's receipt of a profits
interest in exchange for services rendered; therefore, the value
of the interest should be taxed as current income under sec-
tion 61. The Tax Court had little difficulty valuing the profits
interest in Diamond because it was sold only eighteen days after
it was received.4 5
The peculiar facts of Diamond, a 1977 General Counsel Mem-
orandum46 and subsequent case law4 7 provided tax practition-
ers with some comfort that the receipt of a partnership profits
interest generally was not taxable on receipt if the interest had
no ascertainable value because it was not sold immediately fol-
lowing receipt. This complacency was once again shaken in
1990 by the Tax Court's decision in Campbell J,48 which made it
clear that valuation of a profits interest was simply a question
of fact. After Campbell I, valuation of a profits interest was no
longer a significant bar to taxation of its receipt.4 9 In Campbell
H, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Tax Court
on the basis that the profits interests had only speculative
value, if any. 50 Adding to the confusion, Campbell H questioned
whether the receipt of a profits interest was generally taxable
at all.5'
41. See id.
42. 56 T.C. 530 (1971), aff'd, 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974).
43. Diamond v. Commissioner, 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974).
44. Diamond, 56 T.C. at 546.
45. Id. at 547. Adding to the confusion, the Seventh Circuit noted that the unu-
sual circumstances of the 30-day receipt and sale constituted one of the rare cases
where a profits interest would be capable of valuation for tax purposes. Diamond, 492
F.2d at 291.
46. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,346 (July 25, 1977); see infra Part IV.A.
47. See infra Part IV.B-E.
48. Campbell v. Commissioner, 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 236 (1990), rev 'd, 943 F.2d 815
(8th Cir. 1991).
49. Id. at 266.
50. Campbell v. Commissioner, 943 F.2d 815, 823 (8th Cir. 1991).
51. Id.
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The cycle and its conclusion are evident. As long as the tax-
ability of the receipt of a profits interest turns on the factual
question of its fair market value, uncertainty will persist. Wil-
liam Campbell won his case, but at great expense. Following
Campbell H, the remaining question is whether the Eighth Cir-
cuit's decision advanced the fairness, certainty, and predict-
ability of tax law, or whether the controversy surrounding the
taxation of a profits interest will continue to rage.
A. Diamond I
Sol Diamond received a partnership profits interest in 1961
in return for mortgage loan brokerage services. Diamond had
rendered the services before the formation of a partnership by
obtaining a mortgage loan commitment on real property to be
acquired and contributed to the partnership.5 2 When the
property was distributed to the partnership, Diamond received
60% of the partnership profits or losses, while his partner,
Kargman, received the remaining 40%.5" Thus, Kargman lo-
cated the property and Diamond located the financing for its
acquisition. Eighteen days later, Diamond sold his partnership
interest to Kargman for $40,000. 54
52. Diamond v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 530, 543-44 (1971), aft'd, 492 F.2d 286
(7th Cir. 1974).
53. Id. at 536. Diamond obtained a $1,100,000 mortgage loan equal to the total
purchase price of the property. Under the partnership agreement between Diamond
and Kargman, Kargman was required to contribute any necessary partnership funds
above the $1,100,000 mortgage loan. Id. In the event of a premature liquidation of
the partnership, Kargman was entitled to a priority return of any future cash contri-
bution before Diamond was to realize any profits. Id. at 537. Under the terms of the
arrangement, the partnership did not receive any capital contributions. Id.
Arguably, the interest in the partnership shared between Kargman and Diamond
was an interest in partnership capital, rather than merely a profits interest. A profits
interest is a relative ownership interest, because such an interest is determined by
comparing the interest with the rights accorded to the other partnership interests.
The Diamond and Kargman partnership interests arguably should have been charac-
terized as a full partnership interest in both capital and profits since at the time of the
formation of the partnership, there existed no independent interests in pure capital.
54. Id. at 544. The sale of Diamond's interest to Kargman was the conduit for a
transfer to a third party. Id. at 539. Diamond assigned his 60% interest to Kargman
for $40,000. Kargman immediately sold 50% of Diamond's interest to the third
party for $40,000. Id.
Interestingly, the additional 10% "control" had a significant value, since
Kargman retained it on resale. If this was the case, could Diamond's interest have
been worth more than the $40,000 sale price? The Tax Court did not discuss this
issue.
Diamond reported no income on the receipt of the interest which resulted in a
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1. Section 721
Recognizing that a capital interest was taxable upon receipt,
Diamond nevertheless asserted that, under the section 721
regulations, a partnership profits interest was not taxable on
receipt. Regulation 1.721-1(b)(1) states in pertinent part:
To the extent that any of the partners gives up any part of
his right to be repaid his contributions (as distinguished
from a share in partnership profits) in favor of another part-
ner as compensation for services (or in satisfaction of an ob-
ligation), section 721 does not apply.55
Diamond argued that the parenthetical implied that the receipt
of a capital interest as compensation for services rendered is
taxable to the service partner but that the receipt of a profits
interest is not. Accordingly, the proceeds from the subsequent
sale of the interest should be reported as a short-term capital
gain. 56 The government countered that the partnership inter-
est was a capital interest rather than a profits interest and was
therefore taxable when received under section 61 and regula-
tion 1.61-2(d)(1).
5 7
Judge Raum determined that Diamond received "property"
in exchange for services rendered before the formation of the
partnership, which was taxable under section 61 .58 The court
expressly rejected Diamond's argument that section 721, as in-
terpreted by regulation 1.721-1(b)(1), exempted the receipt of
a profits interest from the section 61(a)(1) definition of in-
come. 59 Judge Raum noted that the section 721 non-recogni-
tion provisions apply only to a partner who contributes
zero basis in the interest. On the $40,000 sale three weeks later, Diamond reported a
$40,000 short-term capital gain. The gain was utilized to absorb a short-term capital
loss carryover to 1961. The government asserted that Diamond should report
$40,000 ordinary income from services rendered to the partnership measured by the
value of the partnership profits interest received in return. Under this theory, Dia-
mond was entitled to a commensurate $40,000 adjusted basis in the profits interest.
As a result, when Diamond sold the interest to Kargman, he needed to report no gain
or loss from the sale. The net effect of the recharacterization of the short-term capi-
tal gain to ordinary income was to deny Diamond the ability to offset the short-term
loss carryovers against the income.
55. Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1) (1960).
56. Diamond, 56 T.C. at 544.
57. Id.
58. Id. Section 83 was enacted in 1969 and was therefore inapplicable to the
years in issue. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 321, 83 Stat. 487,
588 (1969).
59. Diamond, 56 T.C. at 546.
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"property" to a partnership in exchange for a partnership cap-
ital or profits interest. The judge concluded, "it is clear that a
contribution of services is not a contribution of 'property.' "60
Having determined that section 721 did not apply, Judge
Raum examined Diamond's contention that, even if section
721 only applies to the contribution of "property," the paren-
thetical reference in regulation 1.721-1 (b) (1) expands non-rec-
ognition protection to the contribution of services in exchange
for a profits interest.6' The judge found that the language of
the parenthetical clause meant only that the receipt of a profits
interest was not governed by the regulation which considered
only the receipt of a capital interest for services.62 Judge Raum
concluded, "the effect of the first parenthetical clause . . . is
obscure .... To apply section 721 [in the present case] would
call for a distortion of statutory language, and we cannot be-
lieve that the regulations were ever intended to require that
result."'6
3
2. Valuation
Having determined that the receipt of a profits interest for
services was not governed by the non-recognition provisions
of section 721 or Treasury Regulation 1.721-1(b)(1), Judge
Raum concluded that the receipt must be included in income
under section 61,'" provided the interest has an ascertainable
fair market value.6 5 Diamond asserted that his interest had no
ascertainable value at the time of receipt because the interest
could not be assigned without Kargman's consent.66 Judge
Raum rejected this argument and accepted the government's
valuation of Diamond's interest at $40,000,67 reasoning that
Diamond's interest was actually sold subject to the transfer
60. Id. at 545.
61. Id. at 544-45 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1) (1954)).
62. Id. at 546.
63. Id. at 545-46.
64. Diamond did not argue, and the Tax Court did not discuss, whether it was
proper to include the receipt of a profits interest in income under the economic ben-
efit theory of section 61. The Court simply concluded without further analysis that
since section 721 did not apply, the receipt of the interest was taxable under section
61. Id.
65. Id. at 546-47.
66. Id. at 546.
67. Id. at 547.
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restriction.
68
B. Diamond II
Diamond appealed the Tax Court decision to the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals.6 9 Consistent with the lower court's
opinion, the Seventh Circuit confined its analysis to essentially
two issues: whether, by negative implication, section 721 and
Treasury Regulation 1.721-1(b) (1) prevented Diamond's prof-
its interest from being taxed on receipt; and, if not, whether
the profits interest had an ascertainable fair market value at the
time of receipt.
70
1. Section 721
Like the Tax Court in Diamond I, the Seventh Circuit panel
reviewed the language of section 721 and Treasury Regulation
1.721-1(b)(1), but was unwilling to conclude that, by negative
implication, those provisions excluded the receipt of a profits
interest in exchange for services from current taxation. The
court noted that the legislative history of section 721 and
Treasury Regulation 1.721-1 was "equivocal." ' 7 1 In addition,
68. Id. While a transfer restriction is one factor to be considered in determining
value, it is not necessarily a determinative factor. Id. at 546. In any event, the
$40,000 sale of the interest subject to the transfer restriction properly considered the
value of the restriction.
69. Diamond v. Commissioner, 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974).
70. The Seventh Circuit did not review the Tax Court's conclusion that a contri-
bution of personal services was not "property" for purposes of section 721. Id. at
289. The court did, however, observe that section 721 was silent on the issue of a
contribution of services unless the term "property" included services. Id.
71. The court noted that a number of statements in the hearings and committee
reports regarding the legislative history of section 721 and Treasury Regulation
1.721-1, paralleled the parenthetical phrase "as distinguished from a share in part-
nership profits" in Treasury Regulation 1.721-1(b) and provided that section 721
does not apply when a taxpayer receives only a profits share. Id. (quoting S. REP. No.
1616, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 117 (1960)). The court also noted a statement by Arthur
Willis, the chairman of the Internal Revenue Code Subchapter K Advisory Group,
that "if the service partner 'were to receive merely an interest in future profits in
exchange for his services, he would have no immediate taxable gain because he
would be taxed on his share of the income as it was earned.' " Id. (citing Hearings on
the Advisory Group Recommendations on Subchapters C, J and K of the Internal Revenue Service
Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1959)). The court
reasoned that the "lack of concern over an income tax impact when only a profit-
share was conferred might imply that such conferring of a profit-share would not be
taxable under any circumstances, or might imply an opinion that it would be income
or not under § 61 depending upon whether it had a determinable market value or
not." Id. at 290.
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previous administrative and judicial interpretation of the sec-
tions provided little guidance.7 2 The court acknowledged nu-
merous commentators' opinions on the issue, and recognized
that they were unanimous in their decision that the conferral of
a profit share as compensation for services is not income at the
time of the conferral.7" After calling upon the government to
issue regulations to resolve the issue, the court determined
that, in view of the widespread nature of the controversy, the
wisest policy was to defer to the expertise of the government
and the Tax Court.74 Therefore, without analysis, it affirmed
that the receipt of a profits interest with a determinable market
value is income at the time of receipt.75
2. Valuation
The Seventh Circuit also affirmed the Tax Court's decision
that Diamond's profits interest had an ascertainable fair market
value at the time received.76 The court had little difficulty
agreeing that the profit interest had a determinable market
value because Diamond's services had been completely per-
formed, and the prospect of earnings from the real estate activ-
ity was evidently very good.77 In discussing the valuation of a
profits interest, however, the court recognized that in most
cases the value of the profits interest would be speculative at
best.78
72. In considering the government's interpretation of section 721 and Treasury
Regulation 1.721-1, the court noted that the Service had not, since its victory in Dia-
mond I, "asserted delinquencies where a taxpayer who received a profit-share with
determinable market value in return for services failed to report the value as income,
or [by regulation] has otherwise acted consistently with the Tax Court decision." Id.
The court also noted that judicial interpretation of the provisions was sparse.
Only one unexplained statement by the Tax Court, a footnote in Hale v. Commis-
sioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1947, 1502 n.3 (1965), squarely addressed the question:
"under [Treasury Regulation 1.721-1(b),] the mere receipt of a partnership interest
in future profits does not create any tax liability." Id.
73. Id. at 289 & n.4. The court noted that although unanimous in their treatment
of the profits interest, the commentators had provided little explanation or statutory
analysis to support the conclusion that the receipt of a profits interest in exchange for
services rendered is not income at the time the interest is conferred. Id.
74. Id. at 291.
75. Id.
76. Id. Since neither the government, Diamond, nor the Tax Court raised the
issue of whether the receipt of a profits interest constituted a currently taxable eco-
nomic benefit under section 61, the issue was not addressed by the Seventh Circuit.
77. Id. at 290.
78. The court explained:
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3. Double Taxation
Unlike the Tax Court, the Seventh Circuit expressed con-
cern regarding Diamond's argument that he would be taxed
twice if he were not permitted to amortize the value of the in-
terest originally treated as income.79 The court was unwilling
to conclude that the absence of a recognized procedure for
amortization is a reason to not include the value of the profits
interest in income when received.
C. Analysis
The Tax Court's conclusion in Diamond I, that a partner's
contribution of services to a partnership should not be consid-
ered a contribution of "property" for purposes of section 721,
was accurate.8 0 However, it does not necessarily follow that
merely because the contribution of services is not protected
under section 721's non-recognition provisions, the receipt is
automatically taxable. In such cases, the quality of the "re-
ceipt" must be examined in order to determine if the receipt is
affirmatively taxable under section 61. In failing to discuss this
There must be a wide variation in the degree to which a profit-share created
in favor of a partner who has or will render service has a determinable mar-
ket value at the moment of creation. Surely in many of the typical situations it will
have only speculative value, if any.
Id. at 290 (emphasis added).
79. Id. at 290-91. Diamond argued that he would be subject to double taxation if
he were taxed on the market value of a profit share at the time it was received and
later taxed on the full share of partnership earnings as realized by the partnership.
Diamond contended that the problem could be avoided by permitting a service part-
ner to amortize the value originally included in income. Id. at 290.
80. The Tax Court's analysis was arguably flawed. To support his conclusion,
Judge Raum stated that it was "clear" that services are not property within the mean-
ing of section 721 and cited as authority cases that primarily referenced section 351,
the provision that governs tax-free transfers to a corporation. Diamond v. Commis-
sioner, 56 T.C. 530, 545 (1971), aff'd, 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974). Section 721
governs tax-free transfers to a partnership.
Entity transfer non-recognition provisions such as sections 351 and 721 were
intended to encourage a simple reorganization of a business from one form to an-
other by facilitating the transfer of property. See Carter G. Bishop, A Tale of Two
Liabilities, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 23 (1990) (discussing the legislative history of
section 351). The provision of services to the entity does not engender the same tax
policies for deferred recognition as the provision of property. A partner who pro-
vides services is simply being paid for work performed and should be taxed under the
general provisions of sections 61 and 83 governing the quantity, quality, and timing
of ordinary income recognition. Accordingly, a transfer of services to either a part-
nership or a corporation should not be regarded as property.
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second point, the court failed to provide a guide for future res-
olution of this issue.
Sections 83 and 61 govern the taxability of receipts, while
section 721 overrides their provisions with regard to certain
partnership transfers. The theory of section 721 is that re-
ceipts otherwise taxable under sections 83 and 61 should not
be taxable if the taxpayer has merely altered its form of doing
business. However, nothing in section 721 requires a receipt to
be taxable if the receipt would otherwise be nontaxable under
sections 83 and 61.
Under sections 83 and 61, the first question is whether the
service partner has received a currently taxable economic ben-
efit in exchange for the services rendered. This economic ben-
efit issue is resolved by determining, as a matter of federal law,
whether the rights acquired by the service partner in exchange
for the services constitute more than a "mere promise to
pay."" A mere promise to pay will not be taxable, even if it
has an ascertainable market value and is not subject to forfei-
ture.8 2 In the final analysis, it is not uncertain value or market
risk exposure that blocks the current taxability of a mere prom-
ise to pay. It is simply where the line must be drawn to pre-
serve separate treatment for cash and accrual method
taxpayers. Without this line, there would be little difference
between the two methods of accounting.
Given the Tax Court's failure to analyze the economic bene-
fit question, the Seventh Circuit's deference to the Tax Court
is both problematic and troubling. The court's "automatic"
approval of the Tax Court's denied Diamond effective review
of the lower court decision, and complex issues of partnership
tax law were left unresolved.
The Seventh Circuit also added some confusion to the de-
bate in its discussion of the double taxation issue. The court
incorrectly implied that Diamond would have been taxed twice
on his partnership interest if he had not been permitted to
amortize it against future profits. The following illustration es-
tablishes that if Diamond had retained his profits interest, the
net tax recognition would have only been $40,000. Upon re-
ceipt of his interest, Diamond would have a $40,000 "tax cost"
basis from including the receipt of the interest in income.
81. Minor v. United States, 772 F.2d 1472, 1475 (9th Cir. 1985).
82. I.R.C. § 451 (1988); Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (as amended in 1978).
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When the partnership actually realized the $40,000 future
profits in future years, Diamond's outside basis in his partner-
ship interest would have been increased from $40,000 to
$80,000. Finally, when the $40,000 cash from the partnership
profits were actually received in return for Diamond's partner-
ship interest, either through a partnership distribution or a
sale, Diamond would have a $40,000 loss. Thus, any double
taxation which occurs is only temporary. The proper debate
focuses on the timing and character of the income and
deductions.
While the above illustration ignores matters of timing and
characterization, it casts the transaction in its proper perspec-
tive. It is clear that the double taxation envisioned by the Sev-
enth Circuit does not occur.
IV. THE POST-DIAMOND AND PRE-CAMPBELL ERA
The aftermath of Diamond I and Diamond II resulted in confu-
sion. Concerned that it may have won the battle but lost the
war, 83 the government quickly conceded that the receipt of a
profits interest was generally not taxable.84 And yet, surpris-
ingly, the government continued to litigate the issue.8 5
Whatever confusion existed within the government, the Tax
Court was not similarly afflicted. Relying on Diamond 1,86 the
Tax Court continued to hold that the receipt of a profits inter-
est was includable in income while determining in many cases
that the interest had no ascertainable fair market value. 87 Val-
uation, therefore, became an important and controversial part
83. This pyhrric victory could occur because the government would be required
to separately value the interest in each case. The compliance costs associated with
the taxation may well outweigh the revenue and policy victories, if any, and may well
convert ordinary income into capital gain where the valuation was unrealistically low
compared to the value of the services rendered.
84. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,346 (July 25, 1977). The government implied that
Diamond I and Diamond 11 did not suggest otherwise since Diamond actually received a
capital interest, not a profits interest. See id.
85. In its appellate brief in Campbell 11, the government again conceded that the
receipt of a profits interest was not taxable. See Campbell v. Commissioner, 943 F.2d
815, 818 (8th Cir. 1991). In Campbell II, however, the Eighth Circuit ignored the
government's concession. Id.
86. Diamond v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 530 (1971), aft'd, 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir.
1974).
87. See, e.g., St. John v. United States, 84-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9158, at
83,194 (C.D. Ill. 1983); Kenroy, Inc. v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 1749
(1984).
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of the profits interest taxation scheme. 88 The following discus-
sion chronicles the developments that occurred before the
Campbell decisions.
A. General Counsel Memorandum 36,34689
In the wake of Diamond I and Diamond H, the government
released General Counsel Memorandum 36,346.0 The Mem-
orandum stated that the government would not recognize Dia-
mond H "to the extent that it holds that the receipt of an
interest in future partnership profits as compensation for serv-
ices results in taxable income." 9' In support of Diamond H, the
Memorandum stated that Diamond received "an interest in
capital, as distinguished from an interest in future profits. 92
The Memorandum also considered the issue of valuation in
cases involving the receipt of profits interests. Specifically, the
Memorandum rejected any method that considered whether
the taxpayer rendered services in the capacity of a partner. 3
The government indicated that this valuation method incor-
rectly "placed a premium on whether the partnership is
formed before or after the services were rendered. '9 4
88. In valuing the profits interest in a partnership, the government generally uti-
lized the liquidation method. Under this method, the total value of the partnership
assets is multiplied by the taxpayer's profits interest percentage. The government
contended that the profits interest should be calculated by multiplying the fair mar-
ket value of the partnership assets, at the time of the receipt of the interest, by the
profits percentage. Taxpayers argued that because any potential liquidation receipt
was significantly subordinated, and therefore unlikely, a value could not be subject to
double taxation. No value could be determined. Until the Tax Court's decision in
Campbell I, taxpayers' valuation arguments were often successful. See infra Parts IV.B.-
E.
In Campbell 1, Judge Scott determined that the zero valuation game was at an end.
Campbell v. Commissioner, 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 236, 254-55 (1990), rev'd, 943 F.2d
815, 815 (8th Cir. 1991); see infra Part V.A.3. This opinion set the stage for the
Eighth Circuit's disappointing opinion in Campbell H, which has simply reignited the
zero valuation controversy. Campbell v. Commissioner, 943 F.2d 815 (8th Cir.
1991); see infra Part V.B.3.
89. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,346 (July 25, 1977).
90. Id. Although the proposed Revenue Ruling in the Memorandum has not
been adopted by the Service, the Memorandum itself has never been revoked.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. The Memorandum also reflected that simply because a person owns the
right to a partnership's profits does not make that person a partner. An examination
of the facts and circumstances is necessary to determine whether the services were
1992]
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B. St. John v. United States95
In St. John, a taxpayer received a 15% profits interest in a
health care partnership.96 The Service contended that the
profits interest should be valued using the liquidation method.
The taxpayer argued that the value of the profits interest was
zero because the oral partnership agreement provided that it
"would receive nothing upon liquidation of the partnership
unless and until the other partners first received their initial
cash contributions.
97
The court accepted the taxpayer's argument that the profits
interest was subordinate and that the partnership's assets were
insufficient to receive anything predictable upon liquidation.
The court nevertheless found that the liquidation method was
the appropriate method for calculating the fair market value of
the taxpayer's subordinate interest in the partnership. 98 In
support of this conclusion, the court reasoned that the profit-
ability of the partnership was uncertain because it "was not li-
censed nor operational and the partnership operated at a loss
... for that year." 99
C. Kenroy, Inc. v. Commissioner' 00
In Kenroy, the taxpayer received an 88.2% profit and loss in-
terest in a land development partnership in exchange for bro-
kerage services.' 0 ' The government contended that the fair
rendered by a partner, as distinguished from an employee or independent contrac-
tor. Id. The proposed revenue ruling attached to the Memorandum explains:
[A] person who acquires an interest in the future profits of a venture as
compensation for services rendered or to be rendered will not be treated as
a partner unless there is an intent to invest his services in the enterprise. In
other words, it must be intended that the return for the services be contin-
gent upon the future success of the venture. The fact that a future profits
interest acquired as compensation for services is sold shortly after it is ac-
quired may be evidence that the seller of the interest intended to receive a
fixed amount for the services rather than investing the services in the enter-
prise and that, therefore, it was not intended that the seller become a
partner.
Id.
95. 84-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9158, at 83,194 (C.D. Ill. 1983).
96. Id. at 83,195.
97. Id. at 83,194.
98. Id. at 83,198.
99. Id. at 83,197.
100. 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 1749 (1984).
101. Id. at 1754.
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market value of the interest was currently taxable. 10 2 The tax-
payer argued that the partnership interest was not compensa-
tion for services, but could be characterized as a contribution
to capital under section 351 or section 721.103 In the alterna-
tive, the taxpayer claimed that the net fair market value of the
interest was zero. 1
0 4
The Tax Court agreed with the government that a receipt of
a partnership profits interest is includable in ordinary income
under sections 61(a) (1) and 83, and Treasury Regulations
1.61-2(d)(1) and 1.721-1(b)(1). 10 5 However, the court ulti-
mately determined that the fair market of the profits interest
was zero. Accordingly, the taxpayer consequently did not re-
ceive any income at the time the interest was received. 10 6
D. National Oil Co. v. Commissioner'
0 7
In National Oil, the taxpayer was the primary organizer and
managing general partner for two oil exploration and drilling
limited partnerships. 10 8 Because the taxpayer was not obli-
gated to make an initial investment, he received none of the
exploration tax advantages. 0 9 Instead, he received only an in-
terest in potential future profits."10
The government first maintained that the taxpayer received
a capital interest in the partnership in exchange for services
rendered in its formation."' In the alternative, the govern-
102. Id. at 1755-56. The Service valued the interest at $367,320. Id. at 1756.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1758-59. In valuing the profits interest, the Tax Court considered the
conflicting opinions of three different real estate appraisers. The government con-
tended that the sales price was not indicative of the true value of the property be-
cause it was not clearly an arms-length transaction. Id. The court disagreed with the
government's conclusion, and instead gave weight to (1) a lender's refusal to base a
loan amount on the higher value proposed by the Service, (2) the value of compara-
ble property, and (3) the actual sales price of the parcel in question. Id.
107. 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 1223 (1986).
108. Id. at 1224. The partnership agreement provided that the taxpayer was to
receive a certain percentage of the partnership income. In return, he was to pay a
corresponding percentage of the completion costs of test wells, as well as operations
costs related to the drilling and completion of all subsequent wells. Id. All up-front
costs were to be borne by the limited partners. Id.
109. Id. at 1229.
110. Id. at 1228.
111. Id. at 1227-28. The Service valued the capital interests as "at least the por-
tion of leasehold costs and intangible drilling costs of test wells attributable to Na-
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ment argued that the expenditure of initial costs by the limited
partners, on behalf of the partnership as a whole, created an
economic benefit to the taxpayer." 2 The taxpayer argued that
he received nothing more than a profits interest, and that no
capital shift occurred, since he was required to pay a propor-
tional share of leasehold costs and initial drilling costs." i3 The
court found that the receipt of a capital interest in any partner-
ship was taxable and should be valued by determining the fair
market value of the interest received." 14 In this case, however,
the court held that the taxpayer had received no economic
benefit and therefore no taxable income."
15
E. Kobor v. United States"
t 6
In Kobor, the taxpayer was a general partner in a property
development venture."i 7 The partnership agreement provided
that he would receive a share of the future profits in exchange
for services rendered, including managing the construction
and improvement of undeveloped real property and financing
construction overage costs."" The taxpayer's right to a share
of the profits was subordinate to the return of the limited part-
ners' capital and repayment of any outstanding liability.'t' In
addition, the partnership interest was subject to a transfer
restriction.12
0
The Service argued that the taxpayer's profits interest was
taxable, and that it should be valued at 40% of the anticipated
value of the interest.' 2' Finding that the taxpayer's interest
was not freely transferable and was subject to substantial risk
of forfeiture, the court held that the receipt of the partnership
tional's interest in the partnerships but paid by the limited partners or the investors."
Id. at 1228.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1228-29. "National received nothing from the partnerships. National
did not acquire the right to be paid any of the initial capital contributions if the part-
nerships were liquidated." Id. at 1228.
116. 88-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9477, at 85,312 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
117. Id. at 85,313.
118. Id. Part of Kobor's responsibility for financing the construction overages in-
cluded providing a personal guarantee for $500,000. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. The taxpayer's profits share could not be transferred without the ap-
proval of a majority of the limited partners. Id.
121. Id. The 40% figure was the estimated present value of the future income. Id.
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interest was not taxable.12 2 The court also noted that.any valu-
ation of the interest would be speculative because the tax-
payer's right to share in the profits was subordinate to the
return of the limited partners' capital and other partnership
obligations. ' 21
V. THE CAMPBELL ERA
A. Campbell I
William Campbell was employed principally by Summa T.
Realty, Inc., a real estate brokerage and consulting affiliate en-
gaged in the business of the formation and syndication of real
estate limited partnerships. 24  Campbell's employment re-
sponsibilities with Summa Realty included locating, negotiat-
ing, and acquiring properties. In addition, Campbell obtained
the financing necessary to acquire the properties and organize
the partnerships that would eventually acquire those proper-
ties. 125 Under the employment arrangement, Campbell was to
receive compensation equal to 15% of the proceeds of each
limited partnership syndication and a special limited partner-
ship interest in each limited partnership he promoted.
126
In 1979 and 1980, Campbell was involved in the organiza-
tion and syndication of three limited partnerships, each of
which was to acquire and operate a hotel.12 7 Campbell re-
ceived a 2% special limited partnership, interest in Phillips
House Associates, Ltd., a 1% special limited partnership inter-
est in The Grand, Ltd., and a 1% special limited partnership
interest in Airport 1980, Ltd.
2 8
Under the terms of his employment arrangement with
Summa Realty, Campbell received the three limited partner-
ship interests in exchange for services rendered in the forma-
122. Id. The taxpayer would forfeit his profits interest if he failed to perform fu-
ture services for the partnership and fund future obligations. Id. The interest could
also be forfeited if the taxpayer transferred his interest to a third party without first
obtaining the approval of a majority of the limited partners. Id.
123. Id.
124. Campbell v. Commissioner, 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 236, 237 (1990), rev'd, 943
F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1991).
125. Id. at 237.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 238-45.
128. Id. at 238. The special limited partnership interests provided immediate tax
benefits and a residual value. Id.
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tion of the partnerships and a nominal cash contribution. 29
Each of the special limited partnership interests was subject to
similar restrictions: (1) a second tier priority to cash distribu-
tions,1 3 0 (2) specified tax benefits, 13' and (3) a third tier prior-
ity to refinancing and liquidation proceeds. 3 2  The
partnerships also restricted transfer of the limited partnership
interests without the consent of the general partner.13 3
Campbell did not report the. 1979 and 1980 receipt of the
three special limited partnership interests as income. The gov-
ernment issued a notice of deficiency, asserting that Campbell
had received taxable income equal to a value of $42,084 for
Phillips House, $16,968 for The Grand, and $20,683 for
Airport. 13 4
1. Section 721
Campbell's primary argument was that he should not be
taxed on the receipt of the three special limited partnership
profits interests because of the special non-recognition provi-
sions of section 721 and Treasury Regulation 1.721-1 (b) (1). 135
Like the taxpayer in Diamond, Campbell argued that, even
though the express non-recognition provisions of section 721
129. Id.
130. Id. at 238-45. For example, under the Phillips House partnership, the Class
A limited partners were entitled to a "priority return" of their 10% capital contribu-
tions per year. The special limited partners were entitled to a special priority return
of $7,391 per year. The general partner was entitled to a $7,391 return per year.
After these identified "priority returns," any money was distributed according to the
profit and loss sharing ratios under the agreement. However, the Phillips House
partnership was not expected to show a profit for about seven years. Id. at 239.
131. Id. at 238-45. For example, in Phillips House, most of the early year tax
deductions were due to expense deductions attributable to: (1) various fees paid to
the members of the Summa T. Group; (2) a charitable contribution of a conservation
easement of $1,200,000 for the facade of the hotel; (3) investment tax credits attribu-
table to certain rehabilitation expenditures; and (4) depreciation. Id. at 239-40.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 238.
134. Id. at 247. The partnership values in the government's notice of deficiency
were based on the following three factors: (1) the size of the special limited partner-
ship interest; (2) the amount paid by the Class A limited partners for their limited
partnership interests; and (3) the number of Class A units outstanding at the end of
each year in question. Id. at 253.
In an amended answer, the government also asserted a negligence penalty
against Campbell for failing to include the value of the special limited partnership in
income on receipt and for taking exaggerated deductions from the partnerships. Id.
at 247.
135. Id.
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only apply if "property" is contributed to the partnership,
Treasury Regulation 1.721-1 (b) (1) extends non-recognition
protection to the contribution of services in exchange for a
profits interest.'36 Campbell argued that the receipt of a prof-
its interest for services rendered to the partnership is not a tax-
able event. He argued that the regulation distinguishes
between a service partner's receipt of a capital interest, which
is clearly taxable under section 721 (a), and receipt of a profits
interest, which is not taxable.
Rejecting Campbell's invitation to overturn Diamond I, Judge
Scott of the Tax Court reaffirmed that section 721 does not
apply to a partner's contribution of services, 37 and that the
court's decision in Diamond I was supported by the policy con-
siderations underlying section 721.138 She explained that
while the profits parenthetical in Treasury Regulation 1.721-
1 (b)(1) was unclear, Campbell's argument for non-recognition
was inconsistent with the plain language of section 721, which
makes no distinction between a partner's receipt of a capital
interest or a profits interest.' 39 The court reasoned that it was
inconsistent for Campbell to argue that the receipt of a service
partner's capital interest is taxable but the receipt of a profits
interest is not. 140 The court, however, gave no explanation
why this interpretation of section 721 is necessarily inconsis-
tent with the statute's treatment of a partner's capital interest.
Judge Scott also explained that the policy supporting non-
recognition for transfers to a partnership are much stronger
for a transfer of property than for a transfer of services.1
4
1
When property is contributed, there is merely a change in the
"form of an asset which the taxpayer already owns."' 142 In con-
trast, when services are transferred, the receipt of a partner-
ship interest represents compensation for services rendered.
In support of this conclusion, the court cited United States v.
Stafford,'14 for the proposition that services do not constitute
136. Id. at 248. The Tax Court accepted Campbell's characterization of the spe-
cial limited partnership interests as "profits interests." Id. at 247-50.
137. Id. at 249.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 248.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 249.
142. Id.
143. 727 F.2d 1043, 1048 (11th Cir. 1984).
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"property."'' 44 The Tax Court made it clear that to invoke the
non-recognition provisions of section 721, the partner must
contribute property. 
145
2. Section 83
After rejecting Campbell's section 721 argument, the Tax
Court focused on section 83 to determine whether the value of
the three special limited partnership interests were includable
in income in the year they were transferred to Campbell. 46
The court addressed what it viewed as the three elements of
section 83: (1) "property" must be transferred, (2) the transfer
must be in connection with the performance of services, and
(3) the transferred property must either be transferable or not
subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture.
47
The Court first considered whether a pure profits interest is
"property" under section 83.48 Campbell argued that his
profits interests were not property within the meaning of sec-
tion 83 since they represented nothing more than an unfunded
and unsecured promise to pay money in the future. 149 How-
ever, relying on the definition of partnership interest found in
the Uniform Limited Partnership Act and the laws of Missouri
and South Carolina, the Tax Court concluded that a profits in-
terest is "property" for the purposes of section 83.150
The Tax Court distinguished Campbell's profits interest
from a mere promise to pay. The court reasoned that the re-
cipient of a promise to pay is entitled to a fixed sum of money,
unrelated to the profits of a business.1 5 1  In contrast, the
144. Campbell, 59 T.C.M. (CCH) at 249.
145. Id. at 250.
146. Id. at 249-53.
147. Id. at 249-50.
148. Id. at 250.
149. Id. Campbell apparently characterized his interest as an "unfunded and un-
secured promise to pay money or property in the future." Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e)
(1978). Because the interest was not "property" under section 83, Campbell main-
tained that section 61 should govern whether the transfer was taxable. Campbell, 59
T.C.M. (CCH) at 250.
150. Campbell, 59 T.C.M. (CCH) at 250. The court reasoned that under Treasury
Regulation 1. 8 3-3(e), the term "property" includes real and personal property.
Under section 701 of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act, as well as the laws of
Missouri and South Carolina, a partnership interest is considered personal property.
The court saw no reason why a partnership interest should be characterized differ-
ently for federal income tax purposes. Id.
151. Id. As a practical matter, though, when no funds have been set aside to se-
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holder of a profits interest is completely subject to the exigen-
cies of the partnership's business, which could result in a wind-
fall or nothing at all.' 52 Since a profits interest, like a capital
interest, bore no resemblance to a mere promise to pay, the
Court determined that such an interest was not excluded from
the definition of "property" under section 83.113
The court next considered whether the profits interest was a
"transfer for services" within the meaning of section 83.154
Campbell argued that no section 83 "transfer" occurred with
respect to his acquisition of the special limited partnership in-
terests. 55 Campbell had acquired these interests for a modest
sum at the time the partnerships were first formed and before
the limited partner capitalization of the partnership oc-
curred.156 According to Campbell, any increase in the value of
the interest was the result of "sweat equity" and was merely
unrealized appreciation, much the same as stock in a closely
held business.157
Judge Scott made short work of this argument and rejected
Campbell's argument as one of form over substance. The
court concluded that the substance of the transaction was an
acquisition of increased value for services rendered in syndi-
cating and selling the limited partnership interests. 5 8 There-
cure payment of the fixed amount, the payment on the promise may indeed be af-
fected by the success of the business. Id.
152. Id. The Court also noted that Campbell's profits interest, like a capital inter-
est, entitled him to a distributive share of partnership losses and charitable deduc-
tions. Id.
153. Id. The court indicated that the interests transferred by Campbell would be
includable under section 83 regardless of whether they were denominated as profits
interests or capital interests. "In either event, they bear no resemblance to 'an un-
funded and unsecured promise to pay money or property in the future' which, along
with money, is excluded from the definition of property within the meaning of sec-
tion 83 ...." Id.
154. Id. at 250-51.
155. Id. at 250.
156. Id. at 251. Campbell acquired his original limited partnership interests in
Phillips House and The Grand upon formation of the partnerships in exchange for
capital contributions of $100 and $150, respectively. According to Campbell, it was
undisputed that the amounts contributed represented the true value of the partner-
ship interests at the time of the contributions. Id.
157. Id. Campbell maintained that he acquired valuable interests in the partner-
ships "as a result of his capital contributions and his own hard work" and not as the
result of any transfer for services. Id.
158. Id. The court stated: "While it may be true that ... [Campbell] purchased
these partnership interests for a nominal amount of cash, it is apparent that, upon
formation, these partnerships were nothing more than empty shells awaiting syndica-
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fore, the interests were deemed transfers for services within
the meaning of section 83.
Finally, the court considered whether the transferred prop-
erty was subject to "a substantial risk of forfeiture" as defined
by section 83 and the accompanying regulations.1 59 Campbell
argued that, even if his profits interest was property according
to section 83, the interest was not includable in income in the
year transferred because his right to full enjoyment of this in-
terest was "conditioned upon the future performance of sub-
stantial services" within the meaning of section 83(c)(1).' 6
Campbell contended that he would not receive anything unless
his future efforts made the partnerships successful because his
profits interests were conditioned with significant subordina-
tion rights. 161 Campbell also likened his interest to an "earn-
out" in that the property would be valueless unless he per-
formed future services.'
62
The Tax Court determined that Campbell's arguments were
spurious, stating that Campbell's future services arguments
were concerned with valuation and not forfeiture issues.163 In
addition, the Court noted that no evidence was presented that
Campbell's right to retain his profits interest was contingent
on future performance. 64
3. Valuation
In its brief to the Tax Court, the government contended that
the Phillips House and Grand interests were worth more than
tion." The court concluded that "in substance, Mr. Campbell acquired a beneficial
interest in [Phillips House and The Grand] at a later date in connection with the
performance of services for his employer and as part of his renegotiated compensa-
tion package." Id.
159. Id. at 252.
160. Id.
161. Id. Campbell was to receive cash distributions or participate in the proceeds
from the sale or refinancing of the partnerships' primary assets only if the partner-
ships reached certain performance levels. Id.
162. Id. In an "earn-out," the purchase price paid to the seller of a business inter-
est is dependent upon the future performance of the business. Campbell would not
receive any distributions from the partnerships until their earnings permitted inves-
tors to receive a return on their investment. In addition, Campbell would not share
in proceeds from the sale or refinancing of these partnerships unless there was a
substantial increase in value. Id.
163. Id. According to the Court, the fact that Campbell's interest in these partner-
ships depended on their increase in value "merely affects their value, not the fact of
their receipt or the requirement that their value, if any, be included in income." Id.
. 164. Id. at 253.
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stated in the notice of deficiency and that the Airport interest
was worth less.' 6 5 The government changed its valuation of
Campbell's partnership interests by "discounting the future
value of the tax benefits and cash distributions which, accord-
ing to the projections contained in each partnership's offering
memorandum, Mr. Campbell would be entitled to receive from
the inception of the partnerships until liquidation."'' 66 The
government's valuation was based on the discounted present
value of the projected tax benefits to each limited partner, as-
suming each partnership was liquidated in 1989.167 Applying
the discount rates, the government determined new values of
$67,000, $30,000, and $19,000 for Campbell's special limited
partnership interests in Phillips House, The Grand, and Air-
port, respectively.'
61
Campbell advanced two arguments on the valuation issue.
He first argued that the value of the profits interests were so
speculative that nothing could be included in income in the
year of receipt. 6 9 Second, he contended that even if the prof-
its interests had value, they were worth less than the govern-
ment's valuation reflected in its notice of appeal and brief.'
7
1
a. Speculative Zero Valuation
To support the position that the value of the profits interest
165. Id. at 253.
166. Id. The discount rates were determined to be 17.9% for Phillips House,
14.35% for Grand, and 26.8% for Airport. Id.
167. Id. To determine the appropriate discount rate, the government calculated
the applicable rate of return for a limited partner in each partnership, the projected
tax benefits, and cash distributions as if all projected results materialized at the times
and at the tax rates assumed in the projections. The government assumed in its pro-
jections that all three of the limited partnerships would be liquidated in 1989, after
the tax benefits declined sharply, and that the sale of the primary asset would not
generate any cash distributions for Campbell. The new valuations did not include
the discounted present value of the projected cash distributions because they were
deemed not to materialize under the hypothetical 1989 liquidation test. Id.
Interestingly, the trial court opinion does not reflect whether the Service failed
to factor in the equation a reduction for the discounted present value of the con-
tested deductions or the additional costs of the asserted negligence penalties. Since
the opinion is silent on this matter, it may be assumed that the Service was not inter-
ested in reducing the discounted present value by the contested deductions. Thus,
the government used only the present value of the projected tax benefits.
168. Id. These discount rates determined a separate value of the projected cash
distributions of $16,665, $5,757, and $6,536 attributable to Campbell's interest in
Phillips House, The Grand, and Airport, respectively. Id.
169. Id. at 254.
170. Id.
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was too speculative to include in income, Campbell relied pri-
marily upon the Seventh Circuit's statement in Diamond II,
which recognized that in many cases the profits interest will
have a speculative value, if any.'
7'
Judge Scott acknowledged that the determination of the ap-
propriate valuation criteria is a matter of law, but the determi-
nation of the value itself is a question of fact. 1 72  To
appropriately resolve such a fact issue, the court could rely
upon or reject expert testimony and evidence.'17  On this
point, Judge Scott determined that the speculative valuation
language from Diamond H was not dispositive, since there were
sales of "similar" limited partner investor interests shortly af-
ter the special limited partnership interest was transferred to
Diamond. 74 Thus, Judge Scott indicated the value of these
profits interests were not speculative.
75
b. Minimal Valuation
If any value was to be set by the Tax Court, Campbell stated
that it should be determined by expert testimony, and not by
the government's unsupported and undocumented valua-
tion.' 76 Having rejected the speculative test of Diamond II,
Judge Scott reiterated that the appropriate test for valuation is
the price at which the property would change hands between
"a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any
compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowl-
edge of relevant facts."' 177 Moreover, since section 83(a) re-
quires that the fair market value of property be determined
"without regard to any restriction other than a restriction
which by its terms will never lapse," the transfer restrictions
attached to Campbell's profits interests were given no effect.'
78
In addition, Judge Scott needed to determine the conclusive-
ness of expert testimony since Campbell produced expert testi-
171. Id. (citing Diamond v. Commissioner, 492 F.2d 286, 290 (7th Cir. 1974)).
172. Campbell I, 59 T.C.M. (CCH) at 254.
173. Id. at 254-55.
174. Id. at 255. The court disregarded the fact that Campbell's interests were sub-
ject to a transfer restriction, since under section 83(a), the transfer restriction was not
one which, by its own terms, would never lapse. Id. at 254.
175. Id. at 255.
176. See id. at 254.
177. Id. (citations omitted).
178. Id.
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mony and the government produced none. 79
Judge Scott discredited Campbell's expert minimal valuation
testimony on the basis of the expert's failure to attach any
value to the tax benefits associated with the profits interests.
The expert reasoned that the tax benefits had no value since
the ultimate deductions carried a substantial risk of being dis-
allowed.' The court also discredited the expert's failure to
account for the overall economic substantiality of the
interests. 8 '
Judge Scott also discredited the government's valuation, be-
cause the discount rates used to determine the value of Camp-
bell's respective profits interests were unreasonable. 1 2  Judge
Scott reasoned that it was unrealistic for the government to
assume that the limited partners would prematurely liquidate
the partnership when the tax benefits dwindled and simply
abandon their right to receive future cash distributions, not to
mention their entire cash investment. 183 Accordingly, the Tax
Court determined that the no cash investment return was arti-
ficially low. Therefore, the discount rate was also artificially
low, which resulted in the ultimate value being overstated.'
84
Having determined that the government's valuation was too
high because of a low discount rate, Judge Scott accepted
Campbell's expert's higher discount rate but also applied it to
179. Id. The court reasoned:
The testimony of experts on valuation may well assist the trier of fact in
making this determination. However, such evidence must be weighed in
light of all evidence in the record. Although we may not, without sound
reason, disregard expert testimony on the question of valuation, we may
reject all or a portion of the opinion of any expert which is contrary to our
sound judgment.
Id. at 254-55 (citations omitted).
180. Id. at 255. Judge Scott appropriately noted that, although many of the de-
ductions were subject to disallowance, the limited partners still paid substantial
amounts of money for them. Id. This argument fails to recognize, however, that
Campbell was, in fact, a promoter. Therefore, he was not entitled to rely on anyone
else when making an investment based upon the promised tax deductions. The regu-
lar limited partners, however, had a cause of action against the promoter if the de-
ductions failed. This factor should have been considered by the Tax Court.
181. See id.
182. Id. The Service had determined the applicable discount rate by discounting
the projected cash and tax benefits attributable to a regular limited partner's partner-
ship interest assuming: (1) a 1989 liquidation of each partnership, and (2) the receipt
of no cash from the partnership relative to their investment. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. Valuation and discount rates are inversely proportional. Therefore, as
the discount rate decreases, the value increases.
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the tax benefits.'8 5 Thus,Judge Scott arrived at her own deter-
mination of the value of the partnerships.
8 6
B. Campbell II
The character of this case changed on appeal as several new
issues were considered which had not been considered at the
Tax Court.8 7 Campbell once again argued that the receipt of
a profits interest was not a taxable event.18 8 The Internal Rev-
enue Service, in contrast to its position in the Tax Court, con-
ceded on appeal that the receipt of a profits interest in a
partnership, in return for services rendered by a partner to the
partnership, is generally includable in the partner's gross in-
come. 18 9 However, the government contended on appeal that
Campbell did not receive the profits interest in return for serv-
ices contributed to the partnership. The government con-
tended that he received the interest in his capacity as an
employee of his corporate employer. Thus, the interest looked
185. Id.
186. The Tax Court held that, using this new formula, the value of The Grand
profits interest was $16,818, approximately the same as determined by the govern-
ment in its original notice of deficiency, and the Airport interest was to be valued at
$15,000. Id. at 256. The Phillips House was valued at $50,000 on this basis, but
Judge Scott determined that since the completion of the funding of that partnership
was considerably more problematic at the end of 1979 when the profits interest was
actually received, it should be discounted an additional 50% to compensate for the
risk of incomplete funding. Therefore, this interest was valued at $25,000. Id.
The Tax Court also sustained the government's assessment of a negligence pen-
alty. The negligence penalty was assessed because of over-aggressive deductions,
not because Campbell failed to include the profits interest income. See id. at 258.
187. Campbell v. Commissioner, 943 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1991).
188. Id. at 818.
189. Brief for Appellee at 13-14, Campbell v. Commissioner, 943 F.2d 815 (8th
Cir. 1991) (No. 90-2730). In its brief, the Service stated:
We have no quarrel with the general statements of the law of partnership
taxation set forth in the briefs of taxpayer and the amici, and do not here
argue that the receipt of a profits interest in a partnership in return for serv-
ices rendered or to be rendered by a partner to the partnership is includable in
the partner's gross income. The principles governing partnership taxation
set forth in Subchapter K or the Code, and the regulations thereunder, gen-
erally would apply to determine the tax consequences of such transactions
between a partner and a partnership. But those partnership taxation rules
are inapplicable here because, as we will demonstrate below, taxpayer did
not receive the partnership interests in return for services he contributed to
a partnership. On the contrary, he received the partnership interests as
compensation for services he rendered to a third party-his corporate em-
ployer. The tax treatment of such compensation is governed by Sections 61
and 83 of the Code, not the partnership provisions of the Code.
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less like a promise to pay from the partnership than a transfer
of corporate-owned property by a corporate employer.
The Eighth Circuit rejected the government's attempt to
characterize Campbell's receipt of the profits interest as com-
pensation for services rendered to his own corporate em-
ployer, rather than to the partnership.' 90 However, the court
concurred in the Tax Court's conclusion that the non-recogni-
tion principles of section 721 were not applicable to service
partners. 19' Additionally, the court presented a new theory
that section 707(a) should control taxability. 92 Ultimately, the
court reversed the Tax Court's valuation determination, con-
cluding that the interests were too speculative.'
93
1. Section 721
The Eighth Circuit noted that since the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986 does not expressly exempt the receipt of a prof-
its interest by a service partner from taxation, commentators
have relied upon three interrelated theories to support the po-
sition that the receipt of a profits interest is not a currently
taxable event.' 94 The Tax Court and the Seventh Circuit re-
jected the first two of these theories in Diamond I and M.'"
The Eighth Circuit agreed that section 721 did not shield the
receipt of a profits interest from taxation, because a service
partner does not contribute "property" to the partnership in
190. Campbell, 943 F.2d at 818. The government's argument raised a question of
fact that had not been argued before the Tax Court; therefore, the Eighth Circuit
refused to consider it. Id. However, the court did suggest that the record implied
that Campbell had agreed to forgo compensation from his employer in return for the
opportunity to receive a partnership profits interest. Id. at 818 n.2.
191. Id. at 818.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 823.
194. Id. at 820. The non-taxable event theories are: "1) based upon Treasury
Regulation 1-721.1(b), a profits interest is not property for purposes of sections 61
and 83; 2) a profits interest may have no fair market value; and 3) the non-realization
concepts governing transactions between partner and partnership preclude taxa-
tion." Id.
195. Id. at 820-21 (citing Diamond v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 530 (1971); Dia-
mond v. Commissioner, 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974)). The court recognized the
distinction between a capital and profits interest in Treasury Regulations 1.83-1(a),
1.83-3(0 and Proposed Regulation 1.721-1(b)(1)(i). The court noted that these pro-
visions implied that the receipt of a profits interest was not taxable under Treasury
Regulation 1.721-1(b)(1). Campbell, 943 F.2d at 820-21. For purposes of section 83,
Treasury Regulation 1.83-3(e) includes all personal property within the definition of
property. Id.
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exchange for an interest.196 However, the court did recognize
the distinction between the receipt of a capital interest and a
profits interest. In the former case, the non-recognition provi-
sions of section 721 are necessary to either tax or shield a
transfer of assets from one partner to another. 9 7 In the case
of a profits interest, the court noted that the non-recognition
principles of section 721 are superfluous, as no transfer of cap-
ital assets is involved.1
98
2. Section 707
Continuing to look for a solution to the taxation riddle relat-
ing to the receipt of a profits interest, the court recognized the
importance of section 7 07(a).' 9 9 The court noted that, as a
general matter, a partner receives a distributive share of the
income of the partnership, rather than compensation from the
partnership.20 0 Section 707(a) provides that when a partner
receives a fee for work performed for the partnership, the pay-
ment will be treated as though between the partnership and
one who is not a partner.20 '
The court noted that section 707(a) was not intended to ap-
ply when a service provider, such as Campbell, acts in a part-
nership capacity. 20 2 The court reasoned that if all transfers of
profits interests were taxable upon receipt, section 707(a)
would be unnecessary since every transfer would be taxable.20 3
3. Valuation
Ultimately, the court reversed the Tax Court's valuation as
being clearly erroneous. 20 4 The Eighth Circuit was troubled
196. Id. at 821.
197. Id. at 822.
198. Id. This is really a response without a meaning.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. I.R.C. § 707(a)(1) (1988).
202. Campbell, 943 F.2d at 822.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 823. The court remarked:
More troubling, however, is Campbell's argument that the profits interests
he received had only speculative, if any, value. We fully agree with this con-
tention and we reverse the tax court .... Recognizing that the tax court's
determination of value is a factual finding subject to clearly erroneous re-
view, and that the tax court does not have to accept an expert's opinion as to
value, we are, nonetheless, left with the firm belief that the court's valuation
was erroneous.
Id. (citations omitted).
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that the Tax Court had ignored the expert testimony concern-
ing the speculative nature of the tax benefits. It concluded that
the Service and the Tax Court placed too much weight upon
the income projections in the offering memoranda, particularly
since the Service did not support its valuation with expert testi-
mony.20 The Eighth Circuit held that the profits interest had
no market value.2 °6
C. Analysis
The Tax Court steadfastly adhered to its twenty-one-year-
old Diamond I rationale. 0 7 Unfortunately, the Campbell I court
attempted to justify its decision in Diamond I to rebut the sub-
stantial adverse commentary that had been levelled at the deci-
sion. Unfortunately, the rationales offered by the court
contain analytical flaws that create a suspicion that Diamond I
was wrongly decided to the extent it held that section 721 does
not shield the receipt of a profits interest in exchange for serv-
ices rendered.
The first problem with the court's analysis under section 721
was its resolution of the section 721 "property" issue. The
court cited United States v. Stafford 20 8 for the proposition that a
partner's contribution of services is not a contribution of
"property" for purposes of section 721's income shield. The
court's determination, however, was based upon an inaccurate
characterization of Stafford. In that case, the taxpayer received
a full limited partnership, not just a profits share.20 9  Thus,
Stafford merely confirms the language of section 721 and its
regulations-when a taxpayer receives an interest in partner-
ship capital in exchange for services, section 721 does not ap-
ply.21 1 Stafford is not helpful in resolving the fundamental
issues raised by the taxation of a profits interest under section
721.
The court also rejected Campbell's argument that a profits
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. This is not surprising given the great deference accorded by the Seventh Cir-
cuit in Diamond I.
208. 727 F.2d 1043 (11 th Cir. 1984).
209. Id. at 1048.
210. Of course, that is exactly the language of Reg. 1.721-1(b)(1); therefore, the
conclusion is not particularly startling and certainly is not a proposition with which
Campbell would likely quibble.
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interest, unlike a capital interest, is not taxable under section
721 and Treasury Regulation 1.721-1(b)(1) because the argu-
ment is inconsistent with the terms of section 721. The court
did not explain why it had reached this conclusion. At one
level, the Tax Court's reasoning incorrectly presumes that any
attempt by the government to regulate a distinction between a
capital and a profits interest would fail.21' At another level, the
Tax Court implicitly assumed that because section 721(a) was
silent on the matter, Congress did not intend to draw a distinc-
tion between capital and profits interests. 2  This latter state-
ment is self-serving, since it reinforces Judge Raum's
conclusion regarding the legislative history of section 721 in
Diamond I. That implication is not so clear, however, as illus-
trated by the Seventh Circuit's review of the same legislative
history in Diamond 11.213 Given the Seventh Circuit's findings,
it is surprising that the Tax Court's interpretation of section
721 legislative history in Diamond I has carried so much weight.
Even the court's tax policy justifications in support of section
721 non-recognition for transfers of property do not withstand
close scrutiny, although the court's arguments have some su-
perficial appeal. The decision implies that because a transfer
of services is not shielded under section 721, all receipts of
profits in exchange for services will be immediately taxable.
However, it is too simplistic to suggest that property transfers
should be treated differently from service transfers to a part-
nership simply because of the difference between property and
services. The real question is whether the service partner has
received a taxable economic benefit.
211. However, the court expressly failed to consider whether Treasury Regulation
1.721-1(b)(1) would be invalid if a negative implication was attributed to the profits
interest parenthetical.
212. Campbell v. Commissioner, 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 236, 249 (1990), rev'd, 943
F.2d 865 (8th Cir. 1991).
213. For example, Arthur Willis, a member of the Internal Revenue Code Sub-
chapter K Advisory Group, discussed the legislative intent of section 721 in his part-
nership tax treatise, which supports the argument that a profits interest was never
intended to be taxed upon receipt. ARTHUR WILLIS, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION 117-22
(2d ed. 1971). He reported that "[n]o one in the group ever suggested that a partner
who received an interest in future profits of a partnership had any income at the time
he received the profits interest. He would report his share of income as it was
earned." Id. at 120. Willis further reported that "[it was felt that this would give the
same result as in the case where an individual is employed and part of his compensa-
tion as an employee is contingent on the future income produced by the property he
is managing." Id.
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It can hardly be argued that all receipts in exchange for serv-
ices are immediately taxable. The taxation of services has its
own natural boundaries, as does the mere change in the form
of doing business analysis for property transfers. In order for
a service provider to be taxable for services rendered, he or
she must receive a taxable economic benefit. Thus, if the re-
ceipt of an unfunded, unsecured promise to pay does not con-
stitute an economic benefit, its receipt is not currently
taxable.21 4
Equally problematic was the Tax Court's application of sec-
tion 83 to Campbell's profits interest. As Judge Scott recog-
nized, a partnership profits interest is a partnership interest,
which in turn, is either personal or real property under state
law. The Tax Court's reliance on state law to define a covered
property transaction was misplaced. The definition of the term
"property" under section 83 is clearly within the realm of fed-
eral law. State law should only relate to the definition of prop-
erty in section 83 as to the nature and characteristics of the
profits interest. Rather than rely upon state law to determine if
a profits interest is property under section 83, the Tax Court
should instead have referred to state law only to determine
whether the state law characteristics of property amounted to
"property" under the federal standard which means determin-
ing whether it constituted an "unfunded and unsecured prom-
ise to pay money or property in the future.
21 5
The real issue, however, is not the classification of the inter-
est as "property" but whether the profits interest is an "un-
secured promise to pay money or property in the future. "216
Judge Scott erroneously resolved this issue by focusing too
narrowly on the precise wording of the statute. This focus led
her to compare a "promise to pay" with a profits interest and
conclude that they are fundamentally different because a prof-
its interest does not promise a payment of a fixed amount.21 7
214. For precisely this reason, the section 83 definition of property does not even
include such receipts. This means that such a receipt would not be taxable under
section 83 even if the promise were non-forfeitable since no "property" has been
received.
215. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(c) (as amended in 1977); Wheeler v. Com-
missioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 883 (1978).
216. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (1978).
217. The Tax Court rejected Campbell's argument because (1) its referenced state
law definition of a partnership interest makes no distinction between a profits and
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The history of the economic benefit doctrine does not confine
itself to promises to pay a fixed amount. Normally, the receipt
of an unfunded and unsecured promise to pay a speculative or
uncertain amount in the future would not be taxable to a cash
method taxpayer on receipt.218 If anything, such uncertainty is
an argument in favor of non-taxation.
More intriguing, however, was Judge Scott's conclusion that
the profits interest was not a "promise to pay" since Campbell
was entitled to tax losses regardless of when or whether any
amount of money was to be received in the future. No author-
ity was cited for this proposition and it was not fully developed.
Since the promise also pays money or property currently in the
form of a reduced tax liability, it is not merely a "promise to
pay" money or property in the future, but is an actual pay-
ment. Although novel, this argument is spurious as well.
Such a "payment" is only an interest-free loan of the deferred
tax liability. The tax must eventually be repaid in the future if
the deduction was not accompanied by a true economic loss. It
capital profits interest and (2) it noted certain fundamental differences between the
profits interest and a mere promise to pay:
The recipient of a promise to pay is generally entitled only to a fixed
amount of money that is not specifically geared to the profits of a business.
This is the case even though no funds have been set aside to secure payment
of the fixed amount so that the payment may in fact be affected by the suc-
cess of the business. In contrast, the holder of a profits interest in a partner-
ship is not promised a fixed amount of money but, rather, is subject to the
exigencies of the partnership's business. He may receive a windfall or he
may receive nothing at all. Furthermore, in the instant case, the interest
received by Mr. Campbell in each partnership was in profits and losses so
that he was entitled to share in the partnership deductions. In fact, any part-
ner, whether he holds a capital or profits interest, will generally be allocated
a distributive share of his partnership's losses and charitable deductions as
was Mr. Campbell in this case.
Because of the differences in the interests received by Mr. Campbell
and a "promise to pay," we consider it immaterial whether the bundle of
rights Mr. Campbell received in such partnership is denominated as a profits
interest or a capital interest. In either event, they bear no resemblence to
"an unfunded and unsecured promise to pay money or property in the fu-
ture" which, along with money, is excluded from the definition of property
within the meaning of section 83 by section 1.83-3(e), Income Tax Regs.
Therefore, we conclude that the interest transferred to Mr. Campbell in
each of the partnerships was property within the meaning of section 83.
Campbell v. Commissioner, 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 236, 250 (1990), rev'd, 943 F.2d 865
(8th Cir. 1991).
In addition, the Eighth Circuit's analysis of the section 83 "property" definition
was far inferior to the analysis of Judge Scott in the Tax Court. At least the Tax
Court specifically analyzed whether a profits interest was sufficiently analogous to the
receipt of an "unfunded and unsecured promise to pay." Id. at 250.
218. See, e.g., Minor v. United States, 772 F.2d 1472, 1475-76 (9th Cir. 1985).
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is also circular to tax a "payment" of a tax deduction since the
taxation would negate the purpose and form of the authorized
deduction.
The point that Judge Scott missed is that a profits interest is
quite similar to an unfunded and unsecured promise to pay
money or property in the future, which is controlled by the
terms of the partnership agreement. 21 9 Accordingly, the prof-
its interest should be no more taxable than the receipt of an
unfunded and unsecured promise to pay an uncertain or spec-
ulative amount under the section 61 economic benefit doc-
trine. The section 83 definition of "property" embodied in
Treasury Regulation 1.83-3(e) and its exclusion for an un-
secured and unfunded promise to pay was designed to default
the receipt of such promises to the regime of section 61 and its
common law economic benefit doctrine.220 Section 83 was not
designed to alter the pre-existing section 61 non-taxation rule
governing the receipt of such promises by a cash method
taxpayer.2 2 '
Despite its problems with the classification of the profits in-
terest as "property," the Tax Court correctly concluded that
the profits interest was transferred for services rendered.
Campbell received a "bargain purchase" of special interests in
fully-capitalized limited partnerships, not for capital, but in
contemplation for services rendered. What other reason ex-
plains Campbell's bargain purchase of the interest compared
to the other limited partners whose price was based exclusively
on capital contributed? The only explanation is that Campbell
219. Judge Scott did not question that the profits interest was not unfunded or
unsecured.
220. See Bishop & Durkin, supra note 26, at 106-07. See generally Patricia Ann
Metzer, Constructive Receipt, Economic Benefit and Assignment of Income: A Case Study in
Deferred Compensation, 29 TAx L. REV. 525 (1973-74).
221. See Bishop & Durkin, supra note 26, at 106-07. Section 83 was principally
directed at preventing the conversion of ordinary income from restricted non-statu-
tory employee stock plans into capital gains when the property was later sold. Id. at
146-47. Section 83 did not change the common law economic benefit doctrine, how-
ever. See id. at 106-07. Treasury Regulation § 1.83-3(e), which defines the term
"property" for purposes of section 83(a), excludes property that represents an "un-
funded and unsecured promise to pay money or property in the future." Treas. Reg.
§ 1.83-3(e) (as amended in 1985). This language parallels the economic benefit test
under the common law doctrine. Generally, an economic benefit has been found
under the common law economic benefit doctrine when (1) the property is secured
against the employer's creditors, and (2) the interest is non-forfeitable. See Minor,
772 F.2d at 1474 (citing cases applying the common law economic benefit doctrine).
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received the beneficial ownership interests in exchange for
services rendered and should be taxed accordingly. 2
Clearly, the most troubling aspect of the Eighth Circuit's de-
cision, however, was the court's failure to give effect to the Ser-
vice's concession that the receipt of a profits interest for
services rendered to a partnership is not taxable. The Court
acknowledged the concession, but dismissed it along with the
Service's alternative argument that the receipt was from Camp-
bell's employer and not directly from the partnerships. 2 s
Such a ruling did not require a failure to recognize the Ser-
vice's concession on the appropriate tax standard. The result
is that the concession is confined to Campbell I and has no prec-
edential effect for other similarly situated taxpayers. 2 4 The
government is now free to reargue this issue in the Eighth Cir-
cuit and in all other Circuits.
The Eighth Circuit took a markedly different approach than
the Tax Court in considering the taxation of a profits interest
under the partnership tax provisions. The court's analysis of
the importance of the application of section 707(a) creates a
strong inference that the receipt of a profits interest is not a
taxable event. However, the vague reference to section 707
was unnecessary and did not illuminate the best way to pro-
ceed. 2 5  By applying the more inclusive common law eco-
nomic benefit doctrine, the issue could have been resolved in a
manner that is completely consistent with the partnership taxa-
tion principles. Under an economic benefit interpretation,
partnership tax rules simply serve as an ordering process for
general income tax rules as they apply among partners. Thus,
when partnership rules do not explicitly resolve an issue, the
222. This of course is irrelevant if the profits interests were neither section 83
property nor a taxable section 61 economic benefit. Judge Scott's analysis of the
transfer for services perspective of section 83 does prevent the manipulation of the
statute in other contexts. Likewise, substantial risk of forfeiture analysis under sec-
tion 83 is irrelevant if the profits interests are not section 83 property. The analysis
on these points are useful, however, as a section 83 perspective on the true receipt of
section 83 property interests.
223. Campbell v. Commissioner, 943 F.2d 815, 818 (8th Cir. 1991).
224. Campbell was entitled to the full effect of the concession and although he got
it indirectly by a ruling that the interests had only a speculative value, the Court's
negligence in accepting the concession has far broader consequences for taxpayers.
225. Section 707(a) has many other unrelated applications on transfer payments
between a partner and a partnership, including non-compensatory transfers for a
partner's loan to a partnership.
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default analysis should be general income tax theory-not an
attempt to read partnership rules in a contorted manner.
The Eighth Circuit's consideration of the section 721 "prop-
erty" issue also did little to dispel any confusion created by the
Tax Court. The court concluded that a transfer of services to a
partnership was not a transfer of property under section
721,226 but that a receipt of a profits interestfrom a partnership
in return for services was property under section 83. The
Eighth Circuit's "no asset transfer" analysis raises a more fun-
damental question that the court summarily dismissed in a
footnote, stating that a profits interest is a property interest
under section 83.227
This is not to suggest that merely because a transfer of serv-
ices fails to be shielded from taxation that all such transfers to
a partnership should be taxable. The Eighth Circuit analysis
failed to consider that only those transfers that are coupled
with the receipt of a currently taxable economic benefit should
be taxed. This suggests that the appropriate interpretation for
the negative parenthetical reference to the taxability of the re-
ceipt of a profits interest in Treasury Regulation 1.721-1 (b) (1)
is that these interests are taxable, if at all, under section 61, not
that section 721 shields them from taxation.2
Since the Eighth Circuit reversed the Tax Court on the basis
of the valuation of the partnership interests, that aspect of the
trial court factual determination should be closely scruti-
226. As discussed in Part III.A. 1. of this Article relating to Diamond I, a transfer of
services is not a transfer of property and should not be accorded non-recognition
treatment because of the nature of the interest transferred. Such a transfer does not
engender the same non-recognition policies involving the mere change in form of
doing business. Thus, section 721 appropriately does not shield taxation of a trans-
fer of services to a partnership.
227. The Court recognized that the Diamond decisions were pre-section 83, and
that the distinction between a capital and profits interest in Treasury Regulations
1.83-1 (a), 1.83-3(f), and Proposed Regulation 1.72 1-l(b)(l)(i) all created the implica-
tion that the receipt of a profits interest was not taxable under Treasury Regulation
1.721-1(b)(1). Nevertheless, the court held that "Regulation 1.83-3(e), . . . includes
all personal property within the definition of property for purposes of section 83."
Campbell, 943 F.2d at 821 n.7.
228. See WILLIS, supra note 213, at 120-21. Willis suggests that the inclusion of the
parenthetical was nothing more than a clarification of the law existing before the enact-
ment of section 721. This interpretation means that the receipt of a profits interest
was not thought taxable under the version of 61 existing when section 721 was
adopted. A profits interest was a speculative payment-not a currently taxable eco-
nomic event.
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nized.2 29 Unfortunately, the Eighth Circuit's failure to resolve
the issue on broader legal grounds, instead of more narrow
factual grounds, means that future taxpayers will face similar
valuation controversies.
VI. ANALYSIS
This is not a new topic. With all the scholarship already
available,23 0 what does this Article hope to add? I hope it will
elevate the debate on the fundamental issues that traditionally
have controlled the resolution of the taxation of the receipt of
a profits interest. The choices are fairly obvious: tax the re-
ceipt of the profits interest or tax the receipts from the profits
interest.
Most cases and commentators have concentrated upon the
tax treatment of the receipt of the profits interest. Theoretical
discussion has centered primarily upon the application of two
sections of the tax code, sections 721 and 83. Resolution of
the issue is complicated because neither section's language or
underlying theory appears to contemplate the precise issues
raised by a partner's receipt of a profits interest in exchange
for services. The language of section 721 addresses only con-
tributions of property to the partnership, and section 83 addresses
only the partner's receipt of property in exchange for services
rendered.
In addition to the barriers created by the statutory language,
misconceptions have surrounded the consequences of taxing
the receipt of the profits interest. One reason frequently ad-
vanced in support of non-taxation is that the income to be
earned from the profits interest will be taxed twice-once at
the time of receipt in the form of the present value of the fu-
ture estimated earnings and again when the earnings actually
mature.2 3 ' This reasoning is flawed because it does not ade-
229. This is particularly important in light of the Eighth Circuit's determination
that its review of the Tax Court on the factual valuation issue was subject to a clearly
erroneous standard.
230. See, e.g., Jan Bradshaw & Kim Itakura, Campbell Renews Controversy Over Taxa-
tion of a Partnership Interest for Services, 7 J. PARTNERSHiP TAX'N 211 (1990); Martin B.
Cowan, Receipt of a Partnership Interest for Services, 32 N.Y.U. INST. OF FED. TAX'N 1501
(1974); Barksdale Hortenstine & Thomas W. Ford, Jr., Receipt of a Partnership Interest
for Services: A Controversy That Will Not Die, 65 TAXEs 880 (1987); Richard R. Robinson,
The Tax Implications of Exchanging a Partnership Interest for Services: An Analysis, 51 J.
TAx'N 16 (1979).
231. See, e.g., Diamond v. Commissioner, 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974).
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quately consider the tax consequences attendant to the dispo-
sition of the interest. The current taxation of the interest will
establish a "tax cost" basis equal to the value of the interest
included in income.232 Subsequent income recognition will
further increase the basis to well above the fair market value of
the interest. 23' Accordingly, when the service partner disposes
of the interest, an offsetting loss will occur.234 Under these cir-
cumstances, double taxation does not occur.2 "
The fact that double taxation does not prevent taxation of
the receipt of the profits interest does not suggest that current
taxation upon receipt is the best response. When the taxation of
the receipt of a capital interest, which is clearly taxable under
section 721 and its regulations, is compared to the receipt of a
profits interest, which may or may not be taxable, several ana-
lytical features evolve. First, the reasons for current taxation
of a shift of partnership capital from one partner to another in
exchange for services rendered are reasonably clear. The re-
ceipt of a capital interest in exchange for property represents
merely a change in the form of an asset that the taxpayer al-
ready owns. These same reasons do not apply to the profits
interest, since the profits interest represents compensation for
services rendered, not property transferred. Second, in terms
of maintaining parity between aggregate inside and outside ba-
sis of the partnership,2 36 current taxation of the profits interest
creates a basis disruption that cannot be corrected by a section
754 election.23 7 Basis disparity was an obvious problem
sought to be cured with the enactment of section 754.238
This is not to suggest that simply because section 721 does
232. See I.R.C. §§ 742, 1011(a) (1988).
233. Id. § 1016.
234. Id. § 1001(a). Assume that ST is single taxation, X is tax on receipt of the
profits interest, Y is tax on actual receipt of the profits interest, and Z is tax deduction
on liquidation of the profits interest. The equation would be represented as follows:
X + Y - Z = ST. In this case, $1000 + $1000 - $1000 $1000.
235. This example ignores the fact that the liquidation loss may be a capital loss
and significantly deferred from the time of the taxation of the income from the profits
interest.
236. "Outside" basis is the aggregate basis of all partners in their partnership in-
terests. Aggregate "inside" basis is the aggregate basis of the partnership's assets.
237. See I.R.C. § 754 (1988). If elected, section 754 adjusts the partnership's in-
side basis in the partnership property. The adjustment makes the purchasing part-
ner's share of inside basis equal to the purchaser's outside basis in the partnership
interest.
238. See BISHOP & BROOKS, supra note 24, at 318.
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not exempt the transfer of services from taxation that every re-
ceipt of a profits interest is taxable. Taxation depends upon
the nature of the receipt. Thus, the focus should shift from an
analysis of what was transferred to the partnership to what was
received from the partnership in exchange for the partnership
interest.
The focus on the receipt of the profits interest will initially
be governed by section 83. Like the analysis under section
721, the decision to tax under section 83 will turn upon an
interpretation of a statutory definition of "property." This
question of whether the profits interest received is more than
an unfunded and unsecured promise to pay money in the fu-
ture, for purposes of section 83, should be resolved by a criti-
cal analysis of the service partner's property rights as created
and defined by state law.239
Finally, if the profits interest is, in fact, an unfunded and un-
secured promise to pay within the meaning of the section 83
regulations, and this Article suggests that it is, then section 83
is no longer relevant. The general income tax principles of
section 61 and the common law economic benefit doctrine
must control. This final point is crucial to the determination of
current taxability. Under the section 61 common law eco-
nomic benefit analysis, a receipt for services is taxable only if it
constitutes a currently taxable economic benefit.240 A cur-
rently taxable economic benefit excludes an unfunded and un-
secured promise to pay money in the future-the same
definition that excludes the receipt of such an interest from the
reach of section 83.241
Recognition of the symbiotic relationship between sections
83 and 61 permits the two sections to be applied consistently.
Such a reading also reconciles partnership tax theory with gen-
eral income tax principles by reinforcing the notion that a part-
nership neither creates nor destroys income. The partnership
tax provisions are designed simply to order the taxation of
239. The issue of whether the profits interest is property is not, as suggested by
Campbell I, controlled by rights that are treated as "property" by mere reference to
state law. See supra Part V.C.
240. See Minor v. United States, 772 F.2d 1472 (9th Cir. 1985); see also United
States v. Bayse, 410 U.S. 441 (1973); Reed v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 138 (1st Cir.
1983); United States v. Drescher, 179 F.2d 863 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 821
(1950).
241. Minor, 772 F.2d at 1475.
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items among the partners as determined under general income
tax theory.
This Article therefore proposes that a service partner should
be taxable only upon the partnership's realization of the in-
come attributable to the partner's distributable share, not
upon the actual receipt of the partnership interest.
VII. CONCLUSION
Complex problems in law and society often are found at the
intersection of related practice areas because of the colossal
tension at such junctions. Since income taxation shadows the
economic effects of commercial transactions, the tax law is af-
fected by other areas of law claiming contextual relevance to
the same commercial transaction. Such is the case with sec-
tions 721, 83 and 61. In each case, the taxability of the receipt
of a partnership profits interest for services rendered to the
partnership may be resolved at a number of different levels.
Only one such resolution is satisfactory since only one resolu-
tion can finally reconcile the tensions that are in ultimate
conflict.
It is now obvious that no court will hold that the receipt of a
profits interest is not taxable by relying on the parenthetical
profits interest exclusion in Treasury Regulation 1.721-1 (b) (1).
Once beyond section 721, the general provisions of sections
83 and 61 must govern taxability. In Diamond I, Judge Raum
noted that since the fair market value of the interest was not at
stake, the matter was to be resolved by taxing the receipt.
242
The Seventh Circuit affirmed in a deferential opinion.243
This resolution unduly burdened the irrelevant market valu-
ation question and ultimately relegated future resolutions to a
factual market valuation question. As Judge Scott demon-
strated in Campbell I, simple valuation matters are factual ques-
tions that trial courts are capable of resolving. Predictably, the
Diamond I eighteen-day resale standard would ultimately bend
to a standard based on facts and circumstances that govern the
quantum of taxability. Rightly so, for what difference in the
nature of a profits interest justifies a completely separate valua-
tion standard?
242. Diamond v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. 530, 544 (1971), aft'd, 492 F.2d 286
(7th Cir. 1974).
243. Diamond v. Commisioner, 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974).
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In Campbell II, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals had a his-
toric opportunity to resolve the issue of the taxability of a prof-
its interest by resolving the issue at the lowest common
denominator. After all, "[i]n crafting rules at the appellate
level, courts must always be aware that primary consideration
should be given to cases not in court. "244 Unfortunately, the
court yielded the opportunity by once again resolving the issue
at the wrong level. The court argued, contrary to the Tax
Court, that the particular profits interest in question had no
market value. This is always an uncomfortable position for an
appellate court-arguing that the factual determination of the
trial court was clearly erroneous. It would have been far better
for the Eighth Circuit to resolve the issue as a matter of law.
and remand the case to the Tax Court for a factual determina-
tion of whether the profits interest was nothing more than a
mere promise to pay and hence not a currently taxable eco-
nomic event under the correct federal legal standard. Its failure to
do so perpetuates the problem. There has been no broad-
based solution to the situation.
This is particularly troubling in light of the government's
concession that such interests generally are not taxable upon
receipt. Of course, the ultimate responsibility for this failure
belongs with the government for failing to promulgate regula-
tions clarifying the position advanced in its brief. Considering
nearly forty years of confusion, why has the government failed
to amend its regulation to conform to its litigation position?
The argument that it is too busy with other regulatory projects
is wearing thin. Taxpayers like William Campbell will continue
to face expensive and unnecessary structuring, accounting, and
legal costs to win this issue when the government intends an
eventual concession at the appellate level. The government
does not want to try these cases. An amendment to the regula-
tion would send the same message to the audit level.
It is hoped that the insights presented by this article will in-
form the judicial and regulatory process in a new and meaning-
ful way. If the Treasury Department continues to shirk its
responsibility for amending its regulation, the appellate courts
must resolve the issue on the appropriate economic benefit
grounds. Either solution would be a marked improvement.
244. Reddy v. Community Health Found. of Man, 298 S.E.2d 906, 915 (W. Va.
1982).
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In the interim, one cannot escape the haunting realism asso-
ciated with T.S. Eliot's telling quotation. Do we really know
the place we are for the first time?
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